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THE PHILOSOPHY OF ART.

ART HAS TO REALISE IN US THAT WELL-KNOWN SAYING, 'NIHIL HUMANI A ME ALIENUM PUTO.'—HEGEL.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ART

AN INTRODUCTION

TO

THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF ÆSTHETICS

BY

HEGEL

AND

C. L. MICHELET

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN

BY

W. HASTIE, B.D.

EDINBURGH:

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1886

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TO

JAMES HUTCHISON STIRLING, LL.D.

Author of 'The Secret of Hegel,'
'Text-book to Kant,' and other works:

THIS LITTLE BOOK

IS DEDICATED,

AS A SLIGHT ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF

GRATITUDE FOR HIS PROFOUND TEACHING IN PHILOSOPHY,

AND OF

DEEP PERSONAL REGARD AND ADMIRATION.

Ἀνδρός, ὡς ἡμεῖς φαῖμεν ἄν,
τῶν τότε ὧν ἐπειράθημεν ἀρίστου
καὶ ἄλλως φρονιμωτάτου καὶ δικαιοτάτου.

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PREFACE

INTRODUCTORY TO THE TRANSLATION.

In England, the Philosophy of Art has been the least successfully cultivated of all the departments of speculative science. The age of the Reformation was too intent upon its immediate tasks, and too completely absorbed in its great creations, to pause reflectively over the modes of its own artistic working. After a period of uncertain movement and decaying power, the acute and versatile understanding of the Eighteenth Century, in reviewing its inheritance from the past, did not overlook the productive activity of the emotional nature; but the criticism and speculation of the age of Enlightenment could not rise above its own peculiarly negative and analytical interest. Even the elegant refinement of Addison, the careful meditation of Sir Joshua Reynolds, and the youthful ingenuity of Burke, present but little theoretical insight, and still less appreciation of historical research. Their barren efforts had a natural reaction and counterpart in the mere psychological analysis of the Associationalists, which culminated in Scotland in the pragmatic School of Alison and Jeffrey. With the beginning of the Nineteenth Century, however, there arose,

as in contrast, a deeper feeling for elemental and essential Beauty, born of strong ideal strivings and of tender poetic insight into the harmony and vitality of nature. And, in continuation of this new movement, our own age has been shewing a gratifying progress in the deepening and broadening of its speculative interest, with closer regard for scientific precision and completeness, and with marked freedom and independence in its appreciation and criticism of Art.

This progress in the artistic insight and sympathy of our time, is, no doubt, largely due to the genius of Mr Ruskin as an enthusiastic expounder of the work of art, especially in the forms of modern Painting and Architecture. And, notwithstanding the occasional divergence and eccentricity of his accompanying teaching, the force and fervour of his stimulus cannot be too gratefully acknowledged. But with all the earnestness and variety and eloquence of the fervid Apostle of the pre-Raphaelite revival, and with all his poetic spontaneousness and subtle charm of association, his thought is, at the best, still too fragmentary and unsystematised to sustain or direct the whole ideal interest of Art. It is just in this sphere, however, where they are so apt to be ignored, that the severity of philosophic discipline and the comprehensiveness of scientific method, are most required to give clear purpose and unity to contemporary effort. Nor, with all his depth and subtlety of feeling, his lofty moral purpose and the elevating glow of his imaginative ardour, can the æsthetic Naturalism of Mr Ruskin, permanently satisfy the higher artistic aspiration of the time, or furnish an adequate foundation for a genuine Philosophy of Art. His affluence of pictorial expression, his intensity and vividness in detail and even his wealth of knowledge gained from close artistic observation, still leave many of the deeper

questions untouched or undefined. Our age needs a doctrine of Art, that can at once recognise its own practical surroundings and problems, and accompany the whole range of its ideal interest through its deepest and to its highest.

It is no longer possible, as in the last Century, to find the required aid and guidance, in the schools of France. The discussions of M. Lévêque, may, indeed, be regarded as the ripest and finest product of the psychological school; but they are nothing more. In M. Taine, again, we have a brilliant French counterpart of Mr Ruskin, with a quicker eye, perhaps, for the external concomitants of the work of art, but with an insight essentially shallower and much less fertile in quickening power. In the spirit of Montesquieu and with the method of Comte, the distinguished French critic has sketched, in facile and captivating phrases, the outline of a positive Philosophy of Art, which explains everything but what required to be explained. His trivial social determinism and his ostentatious moral indifference, shed no fresh light upon the essential problem of Art, nor even upon the track of its movement in history. M. Taine's 'final' explanation of the work of Art by rapid references to the accompanying social and intellectual conditions—'that is to say, the *milieu*'—amid which it arose, can never satisfy an earnest inquirer in search of what is 'final'; and it presents hardly more than a practical commonplace to the Artist. His abundant knowledge and his vivid sketching, cannot redeem the inner vacuity and barrenness of his standpoint; and his æsthetic Phenomenalism, so far from achieving a Philosophy of Art, would render such a philosophy little more than a contradiction in terms.

And yet it is increasingly felt and admitted among

us, that a deeper rational insight into the nature of Art, is one of the wants and even of the yearnings of our time. The free and fertile originality of the new spirit infused into the Century, has largely spent its force; and the artistic impulse is again beginning to grope, as through dim twilight, towards the rising dawn and the fuller power of a coming day. In presence of the great scientific revolution of the time, the restless strivings of a widened sense of moral freedom, and the perplexities of imperfectly realised tasks and aspirations, it is once more the high vocation of Art to have to undertake the redemption of the spiritual life from its outward thraldom and its inner struggles. It will thus eternally be the function of the Art-Spirit to create order out of chaos, and to transform the rude life of new worlds into harmony and beauty. This spirit of formative creation is again vitally brooding over the pregnant deep of the time; and its power alone will be able to harmonise the chaotic and struggling forces that are moving through the gloom, and thereby restore order and rest to the distracted and toilworn individualism of the age.

All this is more or less clearly realised at present, and openly acknowledged. It is felt and said that Art must rise, and is rising again, from her langour and futility, to resume her spiritual sway over material usurpation and lawlessness. But she will only be able to reassert her ancient supremacy, by bringing the united power of all the Muses in her train. The light of science and the wisdom of history must be her guides. Her creative toil may no longer be spent on blind crudities, or wasteful animalisms, or trivial inanities. It must be high and holy, in the faith of the essential ideality of the soul, and in the certainty of abiding reality only in the spiritual.

In England this is being believed again, and the belief

is the herald of the regeneration of Art. It is admitted and deplored that our artistic effort is still purblind and only half grown to the consciousness of itself, in all its spheres. 'The fact is,' says one acute and candid critic, 'as a nation we hardly knew up till recently, in what rational Architecture consisted. We are in the very birth throes even now of trying to understand what it means, what it aims at. The very best that can be said is, that there is hope for us!' And if such can be truthfully said even of Architecture, the most elementary form of Art, what might not be said of our Sculpture, Painting, Music, Poetry? The higher we ascend in the scale of Art, the more manifest does our present poverty become, and the more evident the need of new stimulus, illumination and guidance.

Amid this uncertainty and dimness of Art, it is to Germany that we must turn, for the light and leading of clear and practised thought, until the spontaneity of the national genius again asserts its inherent power. Indeed we have thus been turning, in increasing measure, for half a century; and we have there found the profoundest grasp and the keenest appreciation even of our own greatest works. Our very deepest lessons in philosophical Criticism, as the instructress rather than the mere appraiser of Art, have been slowly learned from the master-minds of the Fatherland.

But the attempt has not yet been made to transplant into England, in its entirety, the profound and comprehensive system of Æsthetics which, more than any other, has ruled the artistic aspiration and criticism of Germany for the last fifty years. Even after all that Goethe had sung and thought, Hegel's Philosophy of Art, by easy and irresistible conquest, won the throne of the Empire of Beauty, just half a century ago; and it has ruled over the realms of Art, almost without a rival, ever since.

Notwithstanding all that has been lately so well said of this modern Sphinx, as he still sits in placid contemplation by the busy highway of contemporary thought, and notwithstanding all that has been so patiently and perseveringly done to penetrate into the strange deep riddle of his proposing, it has been well-nigh overlooked, in our haste and perplexity and self-forgetfulness, how the solution of his enigma is to be most easily divined, or where it is even to be seen in letters of light, so plainly inscribed over the holiest mysteries by the consecrating hand of Art, that he who reads may run. It is more than time we should be turning from the etherial aridities and the unnavigable seas of darkness in Hegel's Dialectic—whatever be its ultimate value—to the brightness and warmth of his own free world of beauty. We owe it to the great thinker himself, who has been too long exposed to the inane mockery of shallow witlings and the revengeful hatred of baffled sciolists. And, above all, we owe it to ourselves, who need, ever more urgently, the aid of his strength and light and guidance in this sphere of ideal aspiration, where, at the best, our movement is but weak and dubious and slow.

In Germany, the supremacy and power of the Hegelian Philosophy of Art is still the most widely acknowledged; and its inestimable value and dominant position, as a discipline and a doctrine, are universally recognised. Here, at least, there has been no disruptive theological controversy, no irresoluble ambiguity of phrase, no insuperable unintelligibility of metaphysics. All is clear, radiant, harmonious, and alive with the things that are a joy for ever. Every branch and all the adherents of the school, have, with one voice, done common homage to the æsthetic teaching of the master. The most accomplished and independent followers in this sphere—

Hotho, Rosenkranz, Roetscher, Weisse, Vischer, Michelet, Koestlin, Max Schasler—have but echoed or unfolded the principles originally laid down. The critical historians of the progress of Æsthetics in Germany, are unanimous in their recognition of the merits of Hegel's 'Æsthetik.' Lotze—the loved and lost—with his careful and conscientious reality, and with all his own inborn art and deep sense of beauty, here yielded the palm to Hegel. Zeller—representing all philosophic learning in Berlin, and measuring thinkers by the standards of Plato and Aristotle—still holds Hegel to be the chief æsthetic teacher; nor, after all that has been said, has his early love and devotion, here at least, grown cold. There must be deep and abiding truth, in what commands and constrains such universal homage and admiration.

And, indeed, Hegel's Philosophy of Art, is entirely deserving of this high admiration and homage. Viewed as a system, it is itself a work of Art, instinct throughout with that supreme genius, which is the subtle essence of all creative Thought. Here the great dialectician shews himself as the Michelangelo in the sphere of rational form, but with the placidity and self-control of Raffaelle rather than the '*furia*' and the '*terribilità*' of the all-subduing Buonarotti. To the German public, who were still puzzling over the earlier enigmatic utterances, the 'Æsthetik' of Hegel came as a pleasing surprise. Its supremacy was at once felt and acknowledged; and it is still regarded as surpassing any single work of the ancients in the kind, and as superseding all kindred efforts before it in modern times. It may be put side by side with the 'Symposium' and 'Phaedrus' of Plato, and the 'Rhetoric' and 'Poetics' of Aristotle; but the soul of its vitality holds the ideal poetry of Plato and the critical penetration of Aristotle,

combined, purified and enriched by all the high forms of Beauty that have arisen anew before the eyes of the world through two thousand years. The formal illuminators of the last century—the later French Rapins, Boileaus, Batteux, Carlencas, Rollins, with all the Abbés, and our own Homes and Blairs and Campbells of the 'Belles Lettres'—fade before this all-irradiating luminary, like the twinkling street-lanterns of prim prudential burghers before the sun. Kant, Fichte and Schelling, Lessing, Winckelmann, Ast, Solger, even Goethe and Schiller and the Schlegels, Jean Paul, Tieck, Novalis—the instructors of Coleridge and Carlyle—taken in their æsthetic and critical activity, are but as moonlight or starlight to the keen piercing arrows of elemental fire that shoot from this self-lit sphere. In the pure ether of thought, its rays stream through the ambient empyrean, till, caught unstained by lower exhalations, they play around the white summits of the highest ranges of Art. All lower forms and hues and stirrings are caught and revealed anew in its brightness, until we feel ourselves moving about in a world of Beauty hitherto not realised. And, in presence again of 'the first Good, first Perfect and first Fair,' all familiar things become more wonderful, and all wonderful things more precious, and all precious things more dear.

Such a system of artistic illumination, cannot but possess essential value and living interest. The universalism of Hegel's thought, the comprehensiveness of his method, the encyclopædic vastness of his knowledge in detail, combined with his deep cherished love of the Beautiful, were the very essentials requisite for the attempt to re-organise and elucidate the world of Art. Much as he has been misunderstood and misrepresented, no one can excusably misappreciate or misapply him here. Admitting the difficulty of his expression, the insufficiency of his

particulars, the disappointment of his outlook, he yet presents us with the first complete organisation of the whole domain of Art, the first rational explanation of the informing principle of all beautiful production, the first connected survey of the whole artistic movement in its historical unity. He has thus made the whole world of Art and its history, intelligible; and has raised it from a chaos of chance and capriciousness and accident, into the holy order of a Divine administration and the rational interest of human science. He touches every part of his subject with the deft, formative hand of a master. His profound spirituality, his certainty of insight, his realistic grasp of the Ideal, his essential morality, his vivifying intuitiveness, his incisive criticism, are all brought to bear, with wonderful harmony and with inexhaustible fertility, upon the problems of Art. Allowing something for the smoothing and finishing touches of the accomplished editor of the 'Lectures on Æsthetics,' Hegel may be said to be here at his best. He is nowhere else so full of animation and attractiveness, so rich in lucid suggestion and available thought, so captivating in outward expression and form, or so entirely at ease with himself and at home with his subject. He is none the less dignified or instructive, withal, while moving with such exceptional freedom, and simplicity, and grace. His sympathies are ever with the highest and noblest, and he is utterly unsparing in his scorn of all things mean or vile. He shews us the divine-human purpose of all true Art, and scares away the whole idle brood of folly from her sacred fane. He has taught his own highest Thought, through his thoughts on the Beautiful; and, in the spirit of Plato, transforming the Philosophy of Art into the Art of Philosophy, he has shewn again 'how charming is divine Philosophy, Not harsh and grating as dull fools suppose, But musical as

is Apollo's lute.' And so he has restored to Art its highest, its divinest power; he has made it the beautiful and irresistible teacher of all holy and sacred things. 'Art,' he says, 'was, in fact, the first instructor of the peoples.' And we add in his meaning—notwithstanding the appearance of a different doctrine in his words—that it will also be the last; for, until the hand of Art has transfigured the whole material and environment of human life into forms of Beauty, through the work of the finite spirit, the education of the race will not be complete. The True and the Good can never be perfected in the real world, until they are permanently wedded to the Beautiful.

It would be a labour of love to work, in however subservient a manner, in helping to make the riches and resources of this monumental masterpiece of the great German thinker, more easily and universally available. In view of the depth of its teaching on all the departments and relations of Art, and of the solidity and comprehensiveness of its Principles of Criticism, a complete translation, with subordinate auxiliary explanations and additions, would, under present circumstances and needs, be an opportune and useful addition to our æsthetic literature. But as neither opportunity nor means for so large a work, are personally available at present, an attempt is here made to introduce the subject in such an outline as may faithfully and intelligently represent the original, and even somewhat satisfy the general reader. Hegel's Lectures, as edited by Hotho, fill three large volumes in the German, and under the notorious difficulty of his style—although that is here reduced to its minimum—an adequate rendering would be a work of considerable labour and time. In these circumstances, only as much of the introductory discussions has been taken from Hegel as exhibits his conception of Æsthetics

as a science, his vindication of its scientific dignity and character, and his general style and manner of treatment. Professor Michelet's summary of the system is then given, as perspicuous, concrete, concise, and the most instructive that could be given in the compass. In adopting this method, there is no artificiality of combination, or lack of unity in the presentation. No man living is in such essential union with the spirit of Hegel, nor has anyone a better right to speak for the master. He is the last of the great disciples, who received personal initiation and consecration; and in Berlin, the ever-varying 'city of intelligence,' he has unwaveringly maintained his loyalty, for half a century, often 'among the faithless, faithful only found.' Dr Michelet's outline is an admirable summary, and it is more. It is a relatively independent and complete sketch, filling up in accurate detail some of the blanks in Hegel's survey. But with all the excellencies of Michelet's outline, what has already been said, will guard the reader from supposing that this is at all an adequate representation of the inner wealth of thought contained in Hegel himself, or that he can ever be sufficiently conveyed by any mere summary or limited analysis. The sketch has, however, been rendered so as to be complete in itself, that the beginner who may be impatient of general discussion in his eagerness for particular knowledge, may take it at first by itself, or may pass on to it should he feel the common light fading as he advances into the deepening chiaroscuro of Hegel. It is hoped at least, that the two parts now given, faithfully studied, will enable the young student to appropriate the prominent facts, and to assimilate some of the essential principles of the system.

The mere beginner, however, must not be repelled at the outset, by encountering a certain formal severity

in the German method, very different from the popular mode of treatment usually adopted by our own more brilliant and delicious writers on Art. For the sake of ultimate permanent gain, he must not refuse even to put forth some intellectual effort of his own, in grappling with fundamental conceptions. Thinking in the sphere of Art, can only have essential value, if it reach the same heights and depths, as have to be encountered and overcome in the other departments of Philosophy. Æsthetic speculation may be winged and sustained by the aspiration and inspiration of the divine Idea of Beauty; but it cannot be made the plaything of children, nor the mere amusement of the idlesse of frivolous and empty triflers. Children, of whatever growth, following their natural affinities, will not strain through Plato and Hegel in the self-denying quest of the eternal idea of the Beautiful; they will rather seek what they want of it, in the glare of the pantomime and the peep-show. Wisdom is here too justified of all her children; and above all of those who find her not in her temporal play but in her eternal form, and in her lasting pleasantness and peace. It would have been a satisfaction to have attempted to lighten any real difficulty of principle or relation; but it is believed that there are few, if any, here, and, meanwhile, Hegel and his distinguished follower, may be left to speak thus far, for themselves. There is only some regret that the intention to say something on the practical artistic significance of the *real* Idealism of Hegel, must be for the present foregone; and especially in this connection, to shew how much more complete and substantial a protest it is against all fanciful or 'overstrained Idealism' in art, than even Mr Ruskin's own Naturalism, and how much more effectually it opens up an intelligible and inexhaustible world of Beauty to the productive Artist.

The high literary relations of the system might also have been shewn, and how it combines the primal subtlety of the essential intellect of the Orient with the natural robustness of the practical mind of the West. All this must be pretermitted meanwhile, with a few concluding indications to available sources of light on Hegel in general. Professor Zeller's special summary will be prefixed as the most succinct synopsis and the most trustworthy reference for guidance.* In the profound works of Dr Hutchison Stirling, our first and ablest expounder of the metaphysics of Hegel, and in Dr W. Wallace's excellent Introduction to his translation of the outline of Hegel's Logic, the fundamental difficulties of the subject have been completely dealt with. Dr

* High critical eulogiums on Hegel's Philosophy of Art might easily be accumulated. But apart from the undesirability of thus loading these pages, what follows will give the reader some material for judging for himself. We may, however, quote two representative judgments as specimens; the one by Professor Bénard, the acknowledged representative of the Hegelian Æsthetics in France, and the other by Staudenmaier, a distinguished critical representative of the Roman Church. M. Bénard sums up his analysis and criticism of Hegel's Philosophy of Art in the following estimate:

'L'ouvrage de Hegel, malgré ses defauts, ses lacunes et ses imperfections, par son étendue, les idées qu'il renferme, la solidité des principes, la profondeur des vues, la fécondité des aperçus et la richesse des details, sa tendance morale élevée, l'intelligence avec laquelle sont traitées toutes les questions d'art et de littérature qui forment son objet, enfin par les qualités de style qui le distinguent, nous parait le miéux représenter jusq'ici cette branche intérressante du savoir humain qui s'appelle l'esthétique, ou la philosophie de l'art. On lui a reproché d'être presque entièrement conçu en dehors de la metaphysique de l'auteur. C'est probablement ce qui le fera vivre plus longtemps que le systeme.'—*Essai.* p. 314.

Staudenmaier, in the course of an elaborate and careful review of Hegel's Philosophy, says:

'We acknowledge with pleasure, that the 'Æsthetik' of Hegel contains many things not only true, profound, beautiful, and excellent, but even classical, which will perhaps never be surpassed. We do not give this eulogium to the general doctrines and principles of his philosophy. Nevertheless, we maintain our judgment on this point; and we believe, that many share our opinion, when we say that the Æsthetic of Hegel seems to be the masterpiece of this master of Thought.'—*Staudenmaier on Hegel*, p. 665.

Stirling's translation of Schwegler's 'History of Philosophy' presents a luminous historical pathway, with bright side-lights by the translator, to the whole system. The principal divisions of Hegel's philosophy have been expounded and translated into French by M. Véra. The 'Æsthetik' has been specially dealt with, in the same language, by Professor Bénard, whose ability is unquestionable, but his translation is evidently very free and is certainly not quite complete. Portions of this French translation have been retranslated into English in 'The Journal of Speculative Philosophy' edited by Mr Harris at St Louis, U.S.A.; but none of M. Bénard's work has been seen by the present translator except his 'Essai analytique et critique' (1852). Various reviews and Essays in French, Italian and English might further be referred to. Of these the most relevant to the present subject, is an elegant Essay on 'The Philosophy of Art' by Mr W. P. Ker, Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford, in the 'Essays in Philosophical Criticism' edited by Andrew Seth and R. B. Haldane (1883). The recent monograph on Hegel in 'Blackwood's Philosophical Classics' by Professor Edward Caird, written from full knowledge and capacity and with masterly ease and instructiveness, may be entirely recommended as an admirable introduction to sympathetic and appreciative study of Hegel. With such ample accessible aid and in view of the limit of this special effort, further elucidation in detail, and all positive criticism, must—though in the hope of further opportunity—in the meantime be stayed.

It may be merely mentioned that what is presented in the following pages, appears now for the first time in English, that it has sprung from an independent interest in Hegel going back to student days when he was not so well known among us, and that the rendering

has been made apart from all other efforts of the kind and out of the original alone. But I am under special obligation to Professor Flint—as in other respects—for the kind interest he has taken in this little work, and for some suggestions thrown out regarding its subject and the kindred departments of Philosophy, in all of which he moves with the ever ready beneficence of his inexhaustible wealth of knowledge and with the power of an acknowledged master.

W. H.

EDINBURGH, *22nd February*, 1886.

PROFESSOR ZELLER'S SUMMARY OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF ART.

WHAT is actually realised in the history of the world, gives, when raised into consciousness, the form of 'the absolute Spirit.' What is thus realised, is the power of the Absolute over all that is particular and finite. Hegel designates this sphere, generally, as Religion. Within it, he distinguishes in particular, Art, Religion and Philosophy.

Art is discussed by him in his 'Encyclopædia of Philosophy,' as it had been already discussed in his 'Phenomenology,' but exclusively in its connection with Religion. A more thorough and fundamental discussion is contained in his 'Lectures on Æsthetics,' which have been admirably edited by Hotho. In these Lectures, Hegel treats of (1) the Metaphysics of the Beautiful, (2) the various forms of Art in their historical development, and (3) the System of the individual Arts. He regards the Beautiful as the sensible manifestation of the Idea, or as the immediate unity of a mental conception and its reality, that is of a spiritual essence and an external form. On this basis, he investigates the conditions upon which Beauty depends, and the different species of the Beautiful. He then derives the distinction of the Oriental, the Classical, and the Romantic forms of Art, from the relation in which the two constituents of the Beautiful stand respectively to each other.

From the same point of view, he divides the Arts into three principal classes:

(A) Architecture, the symbolical Art, which begins to indicate the inner Idea, making the unspiritual a mere external reflex of the spirit;

(B) Sculpture, the classical representation of spiritual individuality, in which the inner and spiritual finds its expression in a bodily manifestation, as both involved in the actual subsistence of the spirit and completely saturated with spiritual life;

(C) The Romantic Arts — Painting, Music and Poetry — whose function is to give expression to the inward consciousness of the mind.

This system of Æsthetics is not to be regarded as the last word of Science in this sphere, any more than the whole philosophy of which it is a part, as has been of late so far shewn. But it is reared upon such a deep and penetrating knowledge of Art, it is so full of striking observations and fertile thoughts, it is founded upon a doctrine of the Beautiful which, though requiring more precise determination, is yet in its essentials so correct, and in all its parts is so completely and logically carried out, that its 'epoch-making' importance cannot be questioned. The whole development of Æsthetics in Germany since the appearance of Hegel's works, is the evidence of this epoch-making importance of his Philosophy of Art, whatever objection may be taken to it in detail, and however it may yet have to be improved.— *Geschichte der deutschen Philosophie*, S. 825-6.

Part First.

HEGEL'S INTRODUCTION

TO

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ART

AS

THE SCIENCE OF ÆSTHETICS.

HEGEL'S INTRODUCTION

ON

THE NATURE, METHODS AND DIVISION OF ÆSTHETICS.

THE Science of Æsthetics has for its object the wide domain of the Beautiful. More definitely, Art, and, in particular, beautiful Art is its sphere.

The name 'Æsthetics' is not entirely appropriate for this subject. The term designates more exactly the science of sensation and feeling. It was adopted when the subject arose as a new science; or rather when the attempt was first made in the school of Wolf, to treat it as a science. This was at a time when works of art were considered in Germany with regard to the feelings which they were calculated to evoke, such as the feelings of the agreeable and of wonder, the emotions of fear, pity and such like; and hence the name. On account of the unsuitableness or, more properly, the superficiality of this name, attempts have been made to form other designations for the science, such as 'Kallistics.' But this term is also unsatisfactory, as the science which is meant to be designated, does not consider the Beautiful in general, but only the Beautiful of Art. We will, therefore, allow the name 'Æsthetics' to stand, because the mere term is a matter of comparative indifference, and besides it has now become so current in common speech

that it may conveniently be retained. The proper expression, however, for our science is the 'Philosophy of Art,' and, more definitely, 'the Philosophy of beautiful Art.'

I.—DEFINITION OF ÆSTHETICS, AND REFUTATION OF OBJECTIONS.

By the expression just given, we at once exclude 'the Beautiful of Nature' from the Science of the Beautiful of Art. Such a limitation of our subject may appear objectionable at first, as grounded on an arbitrary definition, although every science has the right to mark off its sphere as it pleases. But it is not in this arbitrary way that we adopt the limitation of Æsthetics to the Beautiful of Art. In common life, indeed, it is the habit to speak of *beautiful* colour, of a *beautiful* sky, a *beautiful* stream, to say nothing of *beautiful* flowers, *beautiful* animals, and still more of *beautiful* men and women. But without entering into the controversy as to how far the quality of beauty can be rightly attributed to such objects, and as to whether the beauty of nature can be properly placed beside the beauty of art, it may be at least asserted, even at this point, that the Beautiful of Art stands *higher* than Nature. For the beauty of Art is beauty that is born and born again of the Spirit; and as the spirit with its productions stands higher than nature with her phenomena, so does also the beauty of art stand higher than the beauty of nature. Indeed, looked at relatively, even a paltry fancy as it flits through a human brain, is higher than any product of nature; for in such a fancy there is involved both spirituality and freedom. And when looked at essentially and objectively although an external object as the sun, for instance, may appear to be an absolutely necessary fact

whereas a fanciful idea vanishes as an accidental and transitory appearance, yet such a natural existence as that of the sun, when taken by itself, is without freedom and self-consciousness and is indifferent of itself to all else. And hence when we consider it as it is related by necessity to other things, we do not regard it as such for its own sake, and, consequently we do not thus view it as beautiful.

In saying that the mind with the beauty of its Art stands higher than nature, there is, however, hardly anything as yet definitely established. For the expression is indefinite as merely representing the beauty of nature and that of art viewed side by side with each other in a relative comparison, and as only stating a certain external, quantitative distinction between them. The characteristic that belongs to the mind and the beauty of its art as being something *higher* when compared with nature is, however, more than a merely relative distinction. For the spirit is what first possesses true reality of being, and it embraces everything ideally in itself, so that all that is beautiful is only really beautiful in so far as it participates in this higher reality and is produced by it. In this sense the beautiful of nature appears only as a reflex of the beauty which belongs to mind, as an imperfect and incomplete mode of it—a form of what is contained essentially in the mind itself. Again, this limitation of our subject to beautiful Art will appear more reasonable when it is considered that the Beautiful of nature is never taken and treated as an object by itself apart from mind. For although we hear much about the beauties of nature—of which there was less said among the ancients than with us—yet no one has hit upon the idea of taking apart as a point of view by itself the *beauty* of natural things and trying to

make a science or systematic representation of these external beauties. The point of view of *utility* has, indeed, been taken in this way; and a science, for instance, of the natural things that are beneficial in diseases, has been constructed under the name of *Materia Medica*, containing descriptions of minerals, chemical products, plants and animals in so far as they are useful for healing. But from the point of view of Beauty as such, the kingdoms of nature have not been arranged and reviewed. In regard to the beauty of nature we feel that the notion of it is extremely indefinite, and that there is no criterion to guide and give interest to such an arrangement and review.

These preliminary observations regarding beauty in nature and art, the relation of these to each other, and the exclusion of the former from the sphere of our proper subject, should dispel any prejudice that might regard the limitation given to our science as due only to an arbitrary or fanciful choice. The ultimate ground of this limitation cannot, however, be demonstrated here, as the consideration of it falls within the science itself, and, therefore, will come later to be more exactly explained and established.

But if we thus limit our considerations at the outset, to the Beautiful of Art, we come at once in taking this first step upon new difficulties.

1. The first difficulty that meets us in this connection, is the doubt as to whether beautiful Art is *worthy* in itself of scientific treatment. The Beautiful in Art, it is admitted, moves, indeed, as a friendly genius through all the affairs of life and brightly adorns all its surroundings. It softens the severity of our earnest relations, and relieves the pressure of the complications of the real world. Leisure is redeemed by the charm of its presence, and where it

does not actually bring forth good, it at least occupies the place of evil better than would the evil it supplants. And in all other spheres it is also effective in mingling its pleasing forms with truly real things, from the rude finery of the savage up to the splendour of the temple adorned with all the riches of the beautiful. But it is objected that these forms of Art fall outside of the real purpose of life; and if the productions of art are not directly prejudicial to its earnest purposes and may even sometimes appear to further them by restraining evil, yet Art is mainly but a kind of spiritual enjoyment or relaxation, whereas the essential interests of life demand more earnest efforts. Hence it seems to those who hold this view that what is not of an earnest nature in itself, cannot be appropriately treated with scientific earnestness; and that to try to deal with it thus would be pedantic and incongruous. In any case, according to this view, Art is to be regarded as a superfluity in comparison with the more essential wants and interests of life; while the refinement of soul which springs from occupation with the beauty of objects, is represented as having a tendency to become mere effeminacy and so to prove prejudicial to the earnestness of those wants and interests. From such considerations it has often appeared necessary to take the beautiful Arts into protection when the admission was once made that they are a kind of luxury. This has been done more particularly in reference to the question of their practical necessity and their relation to morality and piety. And as their harmlessness could not be absolutely proved from themselves, the attempt was made to make it credible that this spiritual luxury yielded a larger sum of advantages than of disadvantages. In this way, earnest purposes have

been ascribed to Art itself, and it has frequently been recommended as a mediator between reason and sense, that is, between duty and inclination, and as a reconciler of these elements of our nature, in their hard conflict and struggle with each other. But it may be easily understood, that, with all earnestness in such applications of art, reason and duty really gained nothing by these attempts at mediation, because, being by their nature incapable of blending, they did not yield to such compromises but continued to demand the severe purity which they have essentially in themselves. And, besides, Art does not thus become worthier of scientific treatment as it becomes subservient to both sides of this opposition, and may then just as well further idleness and frivolity, as higher ends; and generally, in such a service, it appears to be no longer an end in itself, but is lowered to become a means for other things. And, finally, as regards the form of this mediation, it always presents an unfavourable side, seeing that while Art is thus made subservient to more earnest ends, and produces more earnest effects, the means which it uses for this purpose, are from this point of view, illusive in themselves. For the Beautiful has its life in the sphere of mere *appearance*, in what only *seems* to be. Real essential ends, however, as must be admitted, are not to be effected by illusion, and if they should even gain somewhat by this, it can only be so now and then, and to a limited extent; and even then, illusion will not be acceptable as the right means. For the means should correspond to the dignity of the end; and it is not seemingness and deception, but only real truth that can produce what is real and true. And, science has essentially to consider the real interests of the mind according to the true modes of reality and the true manner of its representation.

In connection with such views, it may well appear that beautiful Art cannot be worthy of scientific consideration, as being only a sort of pleasing play. And even if it were to pursue more earnest ends, yet would it of itself contradict the nature of these ends and at best stand only in the service of amusement on the one side and earnestness on the other. And in either case, it would still be employing as the condition of its existence and as the medium of its effects, only what would be regarded as but apparent and deceptive.

2. There is a second view that may seem even more plausible, which represents beautiful Art as open indeed to philosophical reflections but as not a suitable object for properly *scientific* consideration. The beauty of Art, it is maintained, is presented to sense, feeling, perception and imagination. Its sphere is different from that of thought; and the comprehension of its activity and its products requires a different organ from that of scientific thinking. Further, in the beauty of Art, it is just the *freedom* of its productions and formations which we enjoy. In the process of producing and contemplating them, we escape, as it seems, from the fetters of rule and the bondage of regulated action. We seek for calm and inspiration from the forms of art in presence of the severity of external subjection to law and of the dark depths of thought within. In contrast to the shadowy realm of ideas, we long for the brightness and power of reality. In a word, the source of beautiful works of art is the free activity of the phantasy, which in its mere imaginings, is already freer than nature. Art has not only the whole riches of the forms of nature at command in all their manifold variations of appearance, but it is borne by the creative imagination beyond this whole sphere in the

inexhaustible fertility of its own productiveness. In presence of this immeasurable fulness of the phantasy and its free products, it seems as if thought must lose the courage required to bring these in completeness before itself, in order to review them and arrange them distinctly under its universal formulas.

Science, on the other hand, as is admitted, has to deal, according to its formal methods, with thinking as it abstracts from the mass of individual things. Hence it is alleged that the accidental and arbitrary working of the Imagination which is the organ of the activity and enjoyment of Art, remains excluded from the sphere of science. Again, it is affirmed that Art illuminates and animates the darkness and aridity of rational reflection, and that it thus reconciles the abstractness and dualism of reason with the real world by its forms supplementing and completing the conception of reality. But it is rejoined that strictly intellectual thinking again annuls this means of completing reality, annihilates the forms of Art, and leads back the rational conception again to its unreal simplicity and its shadowy abstractness. Further, as regards its matter, science is held to be engaged with what is necessary in itself. If then Æsthetics lays aside the Beautiful of nature, under this limitation we evidently gain nothing for properly scientific treatment; rather have we only removed the further from the sphere of the necessary in science. For the expression 'Nature' involves the idea of necessity and subjection to law. It therefore presents a sphere of existence which is akin to the scientific method, and this method may be applied to its phenomena with hope. But in the realm of 'Spirit,' and especially in the sphere of imagination, when they are viewed in comparison with

'Nature,' arbitrariness and lawlessness seem to be specially at home. And such a condition of things accordingly withdraws itself from all scientific investigation and explanation. On all sides, then, as regards its origin, its effects and its sphere beautiful Art, instead of shewing itself adapted for the application of the methods of science, appears essentially to resist the regulating sway of thought and to be unsuited for a properly scientific elucidation.

These and similar objections to a truly scientific treatment of beautiful Art are drawn from common notions, considerations and points of view. The discussion of them may be read to weariness in the older writings—especially those of the French school—on the Beautiful and the Fine Arts. And so far these discussions bring forward some facts which are not without a certain importance; and some of the reasonings connected with them have, at first sight, a certain amount of plausibility. Thus the facts that the forms of the beautiful are so manifold in variety, and that the manifestation of the beautiful in works of art is universal and everywhere, are important considerations. So, too, the inference drawn from these facts to a universal instinct of beauty as a principle and impulse in human nature, deserves to be considered. And, in like manner, the conclusions, drawn from the infinite variety and particularity of the notions entertained regarding the beautiful, that there are no universal laws of Beauty and of Taste, may well be weighed. Hence before we turn to the proper discussion of our subject, it seems incumbent not to pass from these considerations without a short introductory elucidation of the difficulties and doubts which have thus been raised.

a. And, in the first place, as regards the *worthiness* of Art to be scientifically considered, it is admitted that a certain transitory play of art may be used to minister to pleasure and amusement, to decorate our surroundings, to add pleasingness to the outward relations of life, and to bring certain objects into prominence by its adornments. In such forms, however, Art is not free and independent, but subordinate and subsidiary. But what we are about to consider is *free* art—art which is free both in its ends and in its means. Art may, indeed, serve other purposes than its own ends, and so far it may become a mere incidental play of forms; but even thought can have this relation in common with it. Thought may, like art, be used in the form of useful science, for limited purposes and accidental objects; and again as a subservient reflection, it may have its application determined not of itself, but by something else. Yet, in distinction from this service of particular ends, thought—and art as well—rises of itself in free independence to truth, and thus fulfils itself independently in the realisation of its own proper ends.

Only in this its freedom does beautiful Art become true Art and solve its highest problem. It enters into the same circle with Religion and Philosophy, and is only a special mode and form of bringing the Divine, with the deepest interests of man and the most comprehensive truths of the spiritual life, to consciousness and expression. In works of art the various peoples have embodied the richest ideas and intuitions of their inner life, and thus beautiful Art often becomes the best guide to an understanding of the wisdom and religion of nations. In the case of some peoples it is the only key that we have to these treasures. This function Art possesses in common with Religion

and Philosophy. But in distinction from them it exhibits the Highest in sensible form, and thus brings it nearer to nature and natural appearances and to the senses and sense-perception. It is into the depths of a supersensible world that thought strives to penetrate, and this is apprehended as a world beyond the present in distinction from our immediate consciousness and present feeling. The free power of thought raises itself in knowledge above the things of the present world which belong to sensible reality and finitude. The spirit further advances to the conception of a breach or separation between its two worlds of conception; and it discovers with the same insight how this breach has to be healed. Forthwith then it produces out of itself the works of beautiful Art as the first reconciling medium between the opposition of the two sides. And thus they rise into being as mediators between what is merely external, sensible, perishing, and what is of pure thought; between mere nature or finite reality, and the infinite freedom of the thinking that comprehends.

As regards the *worthiness* of the element of Art in general, and, in particular, as to its being mere *seeming*, and as to its *illusiveness*, it may be admitted that this objection would have some foundation, if what seems or appears is to be considered in itself as having no right at all to be. But to seem or appear is essential to what really exists. Truth could not be, did it not shew itself and appear, that is, did it not exist *for* something, or be an object for itself and for the mind in general. Hence it is not against the mere fact of its being an *appearance*, generally, that objection can be taken. It can only be the particular mode and manner in which Art gives reality to what is true in itself, that any objection may lie. And in this connection, if the *appearance* in which Art

unfolds its conceptions, be characterised as an illusion, the objection can only have meaning from comparison of the material of Art with that of the external world of phenomena and its immediate materiality, or with that of our own internal world of sensation and feeling. To both of these kinds of experience in common life, we are accustomed to give the name and value of reality and truth, in contrast to Art as wanting in such truth and reality. But when more carefully considered, it is just this whole sphere of the inner and outer world of mere experience that, instead of being called the world of reality in a stricter sense than the world of Art, is to be regarded as a mere appearance and as cruder illusion. The true reality is only to be found beyond and above the immediate experiences of sensation and external objects. For what is truly real is only what has being in itself and for itself, and this must be what is substantial, both in nature and mind. Such substantial being, is indeed, presented as appearing in experience, but in this form of existence it continues to maintain its own essential being, and only thus is it truly real. The domination of the universal powers, that are involved in all being, is just what Art emphasises and shows. In the common world, without and within, the essential reality of being has also a manifestation, but it is in the form of a chaos of accidental things, confused in the immediate perceptions of sense and disturbed by the arbitrariness of circumstances, events and characters. The mere seeming and illusiveness of this crude and perishing world are removed by Art from the reality underlying these appearances, and it puts in their place a higher reality born of the spirit. Far then, from being mere shows or outside appearances, the productions of Art, in contrast to the things of the

common world, possess the higher reality and the truer being.

And just as little may the representations of Art be regarded as illusive appearances when compared with the representations of History. For neither does history occupy the sphere of actual existence as its own; it must likewise adopt a mode of intellectual representation, as the medium of its delineations. And its material narration continues to be qualified throughout with all the accidentalness of the common reality, in its events, complications and individualities; whereas the work of art presents before us the eternal powers that rule in history without this accompaniment of the immediate imperfection of sense and its unsubstantial forms.

And if the appearance of the forms of Art are called illusive, in comparision with the speculations of Philosophy and the principles of Religion and Morals, it is granted that the form of manifestation which is attained in the sphere of thought, is, indeed, the truest reality. But all the more must it be held that the form of the appearance of being in Art has the advantage in comparison with the appearance of the things of sense and of history. For the formations of Art point and refer through themselves to a spiritual reality which obtains representation by them; and while the immediate manifestation of the work of art is not of itself illusive but is rather real and true, the real and true are deformed and obscured by the immediate appearances of sense. The hard rind of nature and the common world makes it more difficult for the spirit of man to penetrate through them to the eternal and absolute Idea than through works of art.

But while giving this high position to Art, we maintain, at the same time, as emphatically, that neither in its substance nor in its form is Art the

highest or the absolute mode of bringing the true and real interests of the mind into consciousness. For, by its very form, Art is limited to a particular range of ideas. Only a certain circle and stage of truth is capable of being exhibited in the element of works of art. An idea in order to furnish genuine material for Art, must have an inherent tendency to go out towards the sensible world and be capable of finding within it a form of existence adequate to itself, such as was the case, for example, with the gods of Greece. On the other hand, there is a deeper apprehension of truth in which it is no longer so related and akin to the sensible world as to be capable of being received and expressed adequately in the material of sense. Such is the higher apprehension of truth in Christianity. And generally, the spirit of our modern world, or, more precisely, of our religion and of our rational culture, now appears to have passed above the stage on which Art constitutes the highest mode of becoming conscious of the Absolute. Art no longer satisfies our highest spiritual wants either in the mode of its production or by its works. We have passed beyond the stage of being able to reverence and worship works of art as divine. The impression which they now make upon us, is of a more sober character; and the feelings they stir within us require to be tested by a higher criterion and to receive other verifications. Thought and reflection have thus soared above the beauty of art. Where there is an inclination to take delight in blame and complaint, this fact may be represented as a sign of degeneracy and ascribed to the predominence of selfish interests and passions, which scare away from Art its earnestness as well as its cheerfulness. Or the fault may be laid upon the misery of the present age and the complicated state of our social and political life, owing to which, the soul is

entangled in the petty interests of the time, and cannot rise with freedom to the higher purposes of Art. A lamentation is heard that the highest intelligence has become subservient to the pursuit of lower interests, in the prosecution of sciences which are useful only for common ends; and that, being thus led astray, it has of itself gone into banishment in this arid and unideal region.

But, however all this may be, it is at all events the case, that Art no longer yields that satisfaction to our spiritual wants which earlier ages and peoples sought and found in it. This satisfaction, even when mainly due to religion, was associated in the closest manner with Art. The fair days of the Greek Art, as well as the golden age of the later Mediævalism, have gone. The reflective character of our contemporary life makes it a necessity, in relation to both the will and the judgment, to fix universal points of view, and to regulate the details of experience by them. It is thus that general laws, forms, rights, duties, and maxims are now recognised as the grounds of determining action and as the main factors in the regulation of life. The general interest of Art, however, as well as the process of artistic production, requires a mode of life in which universal principles are not apprehended merely as laws and maxims, but in which they are realised as operating in immediate oneness with the feelings of the heart and soul. What is universal and rational is thus present at the same time in the phantasy, in harmonious union with a concrete representation of fact. Hence our age, in its general character, is not favourable to Art. Even the producing Artist himself is too often infected and misled by the reflection growing everywhere more articulate around him, and by the universal habit of criticising and judging about Art. It is thus that he is led to aim at introducing more reflective

thought into his works. The whole spiritual culture of the time is so embracing that he stands himself within this reflecting world and its relations, and cannot by any act of will or resolution withdraw from it. Nor could any special training or removal of himself from these relations of life, restore to the artist in solitude what has thus been lost, or artificially bring back the former simplicity again.

From these considerations it appears that Art, on the side of its highest application, is and will remain for us a thing of the past. So far as we of this age are concerned, it has lost the original power of its inherent truth and vitality. It rather occupies the field of our imagination, than asserts its former necessity and high function in the world of real life. What is now evoked in us by works of art, apart from the immediate enjoyment of them, is the exercise of our judgment, in subjecting the idea and the execution of the work of art, with the suitableness and adequacy of both, to the test of thought. The Science of Art has, accordingly, become in our time a much more pressing want than it was in those ages in which Art, as Art, yielded of itself a complete satisfaction. Our Art thus invites us of itself to scientific consideration, not indeed for the purpose of again reviving its original power, but of scientifically comprehending what Art in itself is.

b. If we resolve to follow this invitation, we are at once met by the objection already raised that, although Art may furnish an object suitable enough for philosophical reflection, it is nevertheless not appropriate for a systematic *scientific* treatment. Here, however, we have at the outset, the false notion that philosophical reflection is, in some way or other, unscientific. On

this point the remark can only be made here, that whatever ideas may be entertained by others about philosophy and philosophising, I regard philosophy as throughout inseparable from what is really scientific. Philosophy has to consider objects according to a necessary principle, and not in the sense merely of a subjective necessity or of an external order of classification. It has to unfold and demonstrate its objects according to the necessary principles of their own inner nature. So far, however, as the essential necessity of an object lies in its logical and metaphysical nature, there must be a certain relaxing of the severity of exact science in a separate consideration of Art. For Art involves many elements, both in respect of its subjects and of its material, by which it is continually verging on what is accidental. It is only in reference to the essential inner movement of its ideas and its means of expressing these, that Art proceeds according to a rational necessity in its formations.

The second objection more particularly alleges that beautiful works of art are unsuited for the *scientific* treatment of thought, because they take their origin in the unregulated phantasy and the emotional nature; and, inconceivable as they are in number and variety, they exert their influence only on the feelings and the imagination. This objection appears to be still of importance, and it is felt to be a ground of embarrassment. For it is often asserted that the Beautiful of Art does appear in a form which stands expressly in contrast to thought, and which thought, in order to its own mode of operation, is compelled to abolish. This view coincides with the opinion that what is real in the life of nature and of the mind, is defaced and slain by the process of conceiving it; and that instead of being brought nigh to us by intellectual appre-

hension, it is thus actually removed from us. And hence, it is said, that man in the effort to apprehend what is living, by means of thought, frustrates the very object in view by the fatal nature of the process itself. This position cannot be here discussed in detail, but the point of view may be merely indicated from which the removal of this difficulty—whether felt as irresoluble in itself, or as merely embarrassing—is to be effected.

It will be admitted that the mind is capable of contemplating itself or of having a consciousness, and a reflective consciousness, of its operations and of everything that arises out of them. This active process of thinking constitutes the inmost essential quality of the mind. In such intellectual consciousness of itself and its products, whatever freedom and arbitrariness these may have, the spiritual quality of the mind must be really contained, and their relations must be determined by their essential nature. Hence Art and its formations, springing and being produced out of the mind, are themselves of a spiritual nature. Although the artistic representation takes on the appearance of sense, yet the spiritual permeates the sensible. In this relation, Art of itself lies nearer to the mind and its thinking, than does the merely outward and unspiritual form of nature. In the products of Art, the mind has to do only with what is its own. And although works of art are not pure thoughts and conceptions, but a projection of conceptions out of themselves and estranged in sense, yet the power of the reflecting mind is still able to apprehend them as what they are. For this power does not consist merely in the process of apprehending itself only, in its special form as inner thought. It includes the capability of recognising and knowing itself again in its externalisation, in the sphere and forms of sense and feeling. It thus

comprehends itself in this other form of itself, while retransforming again into thought what was estranged, and thus bringing it back to itself. The thinking mind does not become, in any way unfaithful to itself, while thus engaged with the other form of itself, so that it should forget or lose itself therein. Nor is it so incapable as not to be able to distinguish and apprehend what differs from it. It conceives both itself and its opposite as its counterpart. A spiritual and real conception is what is universal. And this as universal maintains itself in its particularisations, and at the same time transcends and passes beyond itself and its otherness. Thus it has the power and activity to annul again the estrangement into which it has passed. And so the work of art, in which thought externalises itself, belongs in this way to the sphere of conceptual thinking; and the mind, in subjecting it to a scientific consideration, only satisfies thereby the rational requirement of its own inmost, proper nature. It is because thinking is its very essence and conception, that the mind is only satisfied when it has at last permeated all the products of its spontaneous activity with thought, and has thus really again made them its own. Art, like all other mental products, falls under this process; but so far from being in itself the highest form of the mind—as we shall afterwards see more particularly —it receives its genuine authentication only when it is thus comprehended in Science.

Nor does Art refuse from unregulated arbitrariness, to yield to philosophical treatment. For, as has been already indicated, its true task is to bring the highest interests of the spirit into consciousness. And hence it follows at once, that, as regards its subjects, beautiful Art cannot be regarded as merely revelling in a wild lawlessness of phantasy. For, these spiritual interests establish certain

definite limits to its contents, however varied and inexhaustible its formations and modifications may be in detail. The same condition applies to the forms themselves. They are not given up to mere chance. It is not every formation that is capable of being an expression and representation of spiritual interests, or of assimilating and reproducing them. A definite spiritual subject determines a definite form appropriate to it. From this point of view, then, it is possible to find definiteness and order, in accordance with the nature of thought, in the apparently inexhaustible and endless mass of the works and forms of Art.

We have thus indicated the nature and limits of the science with which we are dealing. And we have seen that neither is beautiful Art unworthy of a philosophical consideration, nor is philosophical science incapable of comprehending the essential nature of Art.

II.—THE METHODS OF SCIENTIFIC TREATMENT.

Proceeding now to inquire into the true mode of scientifically considering Art, we again encounter two opposite methods of treatment. Each of them appears to exclude the other, yet neither of them seems to bring us to a satisfactory result. (1) On the one side, we see a Science of Art busying itself in a merely external kind of way with the existing works of art, arranging them into a historical series and putting forth observations regarding them, or sketching theories which, at the most, aim at laying down general points of view to guide the judgment as well as the process of artistic production. (2) On the other side, we see a form of science giving itself to independent thinking about the Beautiful, but only producing an abstract philosophy of

Beauty that is entirely universal and does not reach the work of art in its individual form.

1. The first mode of dealing with the subject starts from the *empirical* or the facts of experience, and it is necessarily the way that will be followed by any one who aims at becoming a connoisseur or at acquiring a learned knowledge of Art. And, in the present day just as every one wishes to be equipped with the essentials of physical knowledge although not devoting himself to natural science, so it has become more or less incumbent on every educated man to obtain some knowledge of Art. The pretension has thus become very common to pass as a Dilettante and Art-critic.

a. If such forms of knowledge are really to be recognised as learning or erudition in Art, it is manifest that they ought to be of manifold detail, and of wide extent. For the first requisite here, must be an exact acquaintance with the immense details of the individual works of Art, of ancient and modern times. But of these works of Art, some have perished, and others belong to distant countries, so that the misfortune of circumstances has thus withdrawn them from direct examination. Further, every work of Art belongs to its own age, to a certain people and to particular surroundings, and is connected with peculiar historical and other ideas and purposes. Hence erudition in Art demands great wealth of learning, of an historical and very special kind. For, the individual nature of the work of Art refers to what is individual, and requires a speciality of knowledge in order to be understood and elucidated. Lastly, this erudition, like all other learning, needs not only memory for its acquirement, but also a keen imagination, to grasp the forms of the artistic products in all their various

features, and to retain them for clear comparison with other works of Art.

b. Within this mode of regarding the subject, which is mainly historical, there arise various points of view which are put forward as important in forming judgments on matters of art. Such points of view, as in other sciences which have an empirical beginning, form, when separated and collected by themselves, so many general criteria and principles of judgment. In their widest formal generalisation, these are the 'Theories' of the Arts. This is not the place to quote the literature of this subject in detail; and it may suffice to refer to only a few of the writings of this class in the most general way. Looking to ancient times, we may note the 'Poetics' of Aristotle, whose theory of Tragedy is still of interest, the 'Ars Poetica' of Horace, and the writing of Longinus 'On the Sublime.' These productions—the latter two more particularly—give us a general idea of the manner in which such theorising has been practised. The general definitions, formed by abstraction, were to be adopted as the precepts and rules according to which works of art were to be produced, especially in times of the degeneracy of poetry and art. They were receipts for guidance in practice. But, in point of fact, these physicians of Art prescribed recipes for the healing of poetry which were even less certain than those prescribed by the professional physicians for the restoration of health.

I will only remark in reference to Theories of this kind that although they may contain much that is instructive in detail, yet their generalisations were drawn from a very limited circle of works of art. These works were accepted as the genuinely beautiful examples of their class, although they covered but a small section of the sphere of

art. On the other hand, the definitions given were little more than trivial reflections, which in their generality led to no settlement of particular points, though this is always the chief difficulty. The Epistle of Horace, just referred to, is full of such reflections, and it has thus become an everybody's book, but for that very reason it contains a great deal that amounts to nothing at all. Such are the phrases, '*omne tulit punctum*' and such like, which —like such practical maxims as 'Stay at home and follow an honest livelihood'—are all very well in their generality, but they are lacking in definiteness, which is the main desideratum in the sphere of action. Another prevailing interest that entered into this way of looking at art, lay not so much in the express purpose of directly effecting the production of genuine works, as in the intention to form the 'Taste' and to educate the judgment in matters of art. In this connection may be mentioned Home's 'Elements of Criticism,' the writings of Batteux, and Ramler's 'Introduction to the Beautiful Sciences'. As thus used, 'Taste' regards the ordering and treatment, with the appropriateness and finish, of what belongs to the outward appearance of a work of Art. Further, there were embodied in the principles of 'Taste' such views as belonged to the psychology of the time, and as had been gathered from empirical observation of the faculties and powers of the mind. In particular, attention was given to the passions, as to their probable gradations, their consequences and such like. But it will be always the case that every one will view works of art, or characters, actions and events, according to the measure of his own insight and feelings. And, moreover, as this cultivation of Taste only reached what was outward and commonplace, and as its precepts were drawn from a comparatively narrow circle of works of Art, and a

limited culture of the understanding and soul, its range was insufficient, and it was incapable of appropriating inner essential truth, or of quickening the intellect to its apprehension.

In general, such Theories proceed in the manner of the other non-philosophical Sciences. The material which they subject to review, is accepted from observational perception as it is found presented in experience. Then the further question comes up as to the character of this object of perception, when the need of more precise conceptions emerges. These are suggested by the conditions of the facts observed, and they are put forth in definitions. Here we find ourselves upon uncertain ground where everything is subject to controversy. At first, it may appear that the Beautiful is quite a simple idea. But it is soon ascertained that several sides may be discerned in it. Then one theoriser emphasises one point, and another a different point; or if the same points of view are under consideration, a conflict arises round the question as to which point of view is to be regarded as the essential one.

In this regard, it is considered as a mode of scientific completeness, to quote and to criticise the various definitions given of the Beautiful. We will, however, not attempt to do this, either from mere historical interest or in the historical completeness of an investigation into all the fine distinctions of these definitions. But, by way of illustration, we may refer to some of the recent and more interesting ways of defining the subject, as they point more definitely at what really lies in the idea of the Beautiful. With this purpose in view, we may specially recall the definition of the Beautiful adopted by Goethe, as it is incorporated by Meyer in his 'History of the Plastic Arts in Greece.'

Although Hirt is not named, his view is at the same time indicated in the context.

Hirt, really one of the greatest Art-critics of his time, has put forward his view in an essay on the Beautiful of Art in the 'Horen' (1797, Part 7). After speaking of the Beautiful in the different Arts, he states as the result that the basis of a correct appreciation of the Beautiful in Art and of the cultivation of Taste, is the conception of what is 'characteristic.' The Beautiful, in particular, he defines as the 'Perfect, which is or can become an object of the eye, of the ear, or of the imagination.' The Perfect, he further defines as 'what corresponds to its end, that is, to what nature or art in the formation of the object, proposed as its final cause, in respect of its genus and species.' Hence, in order to form our judgment of beauty, attention must be directed as much as possible to the individual marks which distinguish a thing. For, these marks just constitute what is 'characteristic' of it. By character, as a law of Art, he, accordingly, understands 'that definite individuality by which forms, movement and gesture, mien and expression, local colouring, light and shade, chiaroscuro and posture are distinguished; and, in particular, as the proposed objects required them,' This mode of defining is certainly more significant and suggestive than the earlier definitions. If we ask, further, what 'the Characteristic' as such is: then we find that it includes, first, a certain subject as that which is contained in the representation, whether it be a definite feeling, situation, event, action or individual thing; and, secondly, the mode in which this subject is represented. To this mode of representation, the art-law of the 'Characteristic' stands related, in so far as it demands that every particular in the form of expression be subservient to the definite indication of the subject, and act as an element in

expressing it. The abstract definition of the 'Characteristic' thus points at design in the particulars to accentuate the subject which they have to represent. If we would illustrate this thought quite popularly, the definition which lies in it may be put as follows. In a dramatic work of art, for instance, an action constitutes the subject or content; and the Drama has to exhibit how this action takes place. Now, men do various sorts of things,—they converse with one another, they eat betimes, they sleep, they dress themselves, they talk about this and that, and so on. But all of this that does not stand immediately in relation to the essential action as a proper constituent element, has to be excluded from the dramatic representation, so that there may remain nothing which is meaningless or without signification in reference to the action. In like manner, in the case of a picture, which lays hold of only one element of such an action, there are presented in the wide ramifications of the external world multitudes of circumstances, persons, positions, and other occurrences, which have no direct bearing upon that element of the particular action and are not serviceable in the way of indicating its character. According to the definition of the 'Characteristic,' however, only that is to enter into the work of art which belongs to the proper manifestation and essential expression of its own special subject. For, the artistic representation ought to shew nothing that is idle and superfluous.

This is, on the whole, a very important definition, and it can be justified in certain relations. Nevertheless, Meyer, in the work just mentioned, considers that this view passed without leaving a trace behind, and he regards this as having been for the good of Art. For, otherwise, as he thinks, this idea would have probably led to what would

have been like caricature. This judgment, however, is founded on a misunderstanding, in so far as it holds, that, in thus establishing the nature of the Beautiful, the object is to lay down rules for practice. But the Philosophy of Art does not concern itself about the practical guidance of the Artist; it has to determine what the Beautiful, as such, is, and how it has been exhibited in works of art, without aiming at laying down such rules. And, further, as regards the criticism of the definition itself, it is to be observed that Hirt includes what is of the nature of caricature, in his view, for what is caricatured may be 'characteristic.' On the other hand, it is to be admitted that in Caricature, a particular form of character is carried to excess, and there is, as it were, a superabundance of the 'characteristic.' This superabundance, however, is not properly requisite for exhibiting what is truly characteristic, but is an unbecoming exaggeration, by which what is characteristic may become denaturalised. Moreover, the manner of caricature shews itself, further, as the characteristic expression of what is ugly, which is certainly a form of distortion. The Ugly relates more definitely to the character of the subject, so that it may be said that in the principle of the Characteristic, provision for the formal expression of the Ugly, is fundamentally included. In general, however, Hirt's definition gives no exact account of the essential nature of the Beautiful, nor of what is and is not 'characteristic' in the Beautiful of art. In these respects it furnishes merely a particular definition, which, however, contains a certain amount of truth in itself, though in a purely abstract form.

But the further question arises, as to what Meyer himself proposes and prefers, in contrast to Hirt's principle of Art. In the main, he treats

only of the principle of Art as presented in the works of the ancients, but he treats them as exhibiting the nature of the Beautiful in general. He proceeds to speak of Mengs' and Winckelmann's definition of the Ideal, and expresses himself to the effect that he will neither reject nor entirely accept their law of beauty. On the other hand, he says he has no hesitation in adopting the view of a certain enlightened judge of art, as it is definitive and appears to solve the problem more correctly. He refers to Goethe. Goethe says, 'the highest principle of the ancients was the Significant; and the highest result of a happy treatment, the Beautiful.' If we examine closely what is contained in this expression, we find in it two things: (1) the subject or idea represented, and (2) the form or manner of its representation. In a work of art, we begin with what is immediately presented to us, and then ask what is its meaning or subject. The external appearance is not the whole of the object in itself; there is besides something internal with a significance or meaning, by which the outward presentation is animated. The external appearance points to this as its soul. An appearance which signifies something, does not exhibit itself and its external form merely, but something more. A symbol, for instance, illustrates this relation; and a fable shows it still more clearly, where the moral or doctrine constitutes the signification. Nay, more, every word in a language has a meaning, and does not exist merely for itself. In like manner, the human eye, the face, flesh, skin, and the whole form, let the spirit and soul appear through them; and the signification is something more than what externally appears. In this way the work of art has to be 'significant,' according to Goethe. Its signification is not to be exhausted by the mere appearance of the lines, curves, surfaces, depressions

or hollows in the marble; or of the colours, tones, words, or whatever other material may be employed. These must unfold an inner life, feeling, soul, or spirit, which is called the 'signification' of the work of art.

With this doctrine regarding the 'signification' of the work of Art, we do not, after all, advance much further; nor is there much more said, than what was presented by Hirt's principle of the 'Characteristic.' According to this view, we have as the Elements of the Beautiful an inner and an outer,—an inner idea or subject and an outer presentation, which signifies and characterises that idea or subject. The inner appears in the outer, and thus presents itself for recognition, and the outer wholly points and refers to the inner. Into the further detail of this theory, however, we cannot enter here.

c. This manner of theorising as well as the laying down of practical rules, which prevailed in Germany during the last century, was at last thrown aside by powerful influences. Chief among these was the rise of a truly vital poetry; and the right of genius, established by its works and its effects, asserted itself against the pretentions of legal prescriptions and the broad currents of shallow theories. On the basis of a genuine spiritual art, accompanied by a corresponding sympathy and penetration, there arose true receptivity and freedom of soul. The great works of the modern world, of the Middle Ages, and of antiquity—including even the productions of ancient peoples hitherto unknown, such as those of India—were now truly recognised and enjoyed. Notwithstanding the strangeness of these works, because of their age and their foreign nationality, their essential ideas and subjects being common to all mankind, overcame the

impression of strangeness until it became a mere prejudice of theory to stamp them as productions of a bad or barbarian taste. This recognition generally, of works of art which lay beyond the circle and forms of the models which had furnished the basis of the abstract theories, led immediately to the recognition of *Romantic Art*, as a special kind of art. It thus became necessary to apprehend the nature and idea of the Beautiful in a profounder way, than was possible according to the earlier theories. And, along with this, came the fact that the speculative thought of the philosophy of the time penetrated more deeply into the nature and idea of the mind in itself, and thus found occasion, at the same time, to investigate the essential nature of Art in a deeper way.

According to the advance thus generally made, the mode of reflecting and theorising upon Art, which we have been considering, has now become antiquated both in principle and application. Only its learning, as connected with the history of Art, has retained a permanent value. And this value it will continue increasingly to maintain as, in consequence of the progress in spiritual receptiveness, the circle of view has been widening on all sides. The function of this method consists in the æsthetic appreciation of particular works of art, with knowledge of the historical circumstances externally conditioning their production. This mode of appreciation, when made with sympathy and insight, and supported by historical information, is the only genuine method of penetrating into the whole individuality of a work of art. Goethe, for instance, has written much in this way, about art and works of art. Mere theorising is not properly the object of such a mode of viewing art, although it may frequently make use of abstract principles and formulas, and may fall unconsciously into

them. Yet if these do not prevent the concrete productions from coming into sight, this mode of examination will furnish the empirical facts and observations necessary as a basis for a genuine Philosophy of Art, which cannot itself enter into particular historical circumstances in detail.—So much, then, for the first mode of considering Art, which starts from the particular facts presented in experience.

2. The second view is to be distinguished from the first as essentially its opposite. It proceeds by purely theoretical reflection, which strives out of itself, to apprehend the Beautiful as such, and to fathom the depths of its essential Idea.

It is well known that Plato began in a profounder way to make the demand on philosophical reflection, that its objects should be comprehended not in their particularity but in their universality, that is, in their genus, or as they exist essentially in and for themselves. Thus, he asserted that what is truly real, does not consist in *individual* 'good' actions, 'true' opinions, 'beautiful' men or works of art, but in the Beautiful, the True, the Good Itself. If, then, the Beautiful is to be comprehended in its essence and conception, it can only be done by conceiving it in thought. By this process the logical and metaphysical nature of the *Idea* in general, as well as the particular *Idea of the Beautiful*, enters into the thinking consciousness. But this mode of contemplating the Beautiful by itself in its Idea, tended from the first to become a mere abstract form of Metaphysics; and although Plato may still be regarded as its founder and leader, this Platonic abstraction can no longer suffice, even for the logical idea of the Beautiful. We must conceive this idea more profoundly and more concretely. The emptiness which clings to

the Platonic Idea, no longer satisfies the larger philosophical requirements of the speculative spirit of the present day. It is, indeed, true that we must also start in the Philosophy of Art from the Idea of the Beautiful, but it is not, therefore, the case that we must keep by the abstract form of the Platonic Idea which, in point of fact, was only the beginning of the true mode of philosophising about the Beautiful.

3. The true philosophical conception of the Beautiful—to indicate its nature in a preliminary way only—must contain the elements of the two extremes just indicated, but combined and harmonised into unity in itself. Only thus will the Beautiful be comprehended in its truth, and as it exists essentially in and for itself. For, on the one side, in contrast to the sterility of a one-sided reflection, it is fertile in productiveness out of itself, in so far as it has to unfold according to its own essential nature, into a whole constituted of particular determinations. This process of inner self-unfolding contains the necessity of the particularisations, as well as of their progression and transition into each other. And, on the other side, the particular forms to which the Idea thus unfolds itself, bear in themselves the universality and essentiality of the involved Idea, and appear as its proper and special determinations. On both sides, this conception advances from the two modes of consideration above indicated. And it is only such a full complete conception that can lead to substantial, necessary and total Principles.

III.—DIVISION OF BEAUTIFUL ART AS AN ORGANIC WHOLE.

We have to survey the Beautiful of Art, as it unfolds itself into a world of realised beauty, in the Arts

and their works. The substance of this world is the Beautiful. What is truly beautiful is the Ideal, which is spirituality embodied in form. More precisely, the Beautiful is the expression of the absolute Spirit, which is truth itself. This region of Divine truth as artistically presented to perception and feeling, forms the centre of the whole world of Art. It is a self-contained, free, divine formation which has completely appropriated the elements of external form as material, and which employs them only as the means of manifesting itself.

The Beautiful develops itself in its own world as an objective reality, and thus becomes differentiated into the particular formations of its individual aspects and constituents. It presents a centre and two extremes, unfolded in the contrast and distinction of special, actual forms. One of the extremes which thus takes form represents the stage of unspiritual externality. It furnishes the mere natural surrounding of the Divine. In this sphere, the purely external representation has its spiritual purpose and idea outside of itself, and as such it receives and bears the form of the Beautiful. The other extreme represents the Divine as an inner and conscious realisation of the mind. It exhibits the subjective consciousness of the Divine in manifold particular forms. Its subject is the Truth embodied as active and living, in the sense, soul and spirit of individuals. The Beautiful is now no longer poured into external formations, but has returned from externality into the inner consciousness of the individual mind. The Divine is thus realised, in distinction and contrast from the pure self-manifestation of the Divinity, as entering into that particularity which belongs to all knowing, feeling, and perceiving in consciousness. In the analogous sphere of Religion,

with which Art in its highest stage stands in immediate connection, we apprehend the same distinctions, only in another form. In the religious sphere, the earthly natural life stands in its finiteness on the one side, and then the individual mind makes God its object on the other. The distinction of the objective and subjective continues, until we finally advance to the devotion of the worshipping assembly, with God living and moving in the religious consciousness. These three cardinal distinctions in the sphere of Religion, appear also in the world of Art, as passing through their own proper development.

ARCHITECTURE.—The first of the particular Arts, with which, according to this principle of division, we have to begin as the external Art, is beautiful ARCHITECTURE. Its task consists in working the external inorganic nature into right form, that it may become related to mind as an artistic objective world. Its material is inorganic matter in its immediate externality, as a mechanical inert mass. Its forms continue to be the forms of inorganic nature, arranged according to the intellectual relations of Symmetry. But in such material and forms, the Ideal cannot be realised as concrete living spirituality. The real object presented by Architecture continues in its externality, in contrast to and unpermeated by the Idea. In other words, the work of art only stands in an outward relation to the spiritual idea. Hence it is that the fundamental type of Architecture is the *symbolical* form of Art. Architecture only paves the way for a more adequate presentation and embodiment of the Divine. It continues to struggle in the service of the Divine, with external nature, in order to work it out of the jungle of finite entanglement and the deformity of accident. Thus it clears and levels a place for the Divinity,

shapes His external surroundings, and builds His temple as a space for inner aspiration and concentration upon the absolute objects of the spirit. It bids an enclosure arise for the ingathering of the worshippers, and for their protection from the threatening of the storm, from the rain, the tempests and the wild beasts. And it thus reveals and makes manifest the spiritual tendency to self-concentration in worship, in its artistic though external way. This signification it impresses more or less upon its material and forms, according as the nature of the essential idea, in whose service it labours, is more or less significant, more or less definite, more or less profound; or as it is obscure or superficial in itself. In this bearing, it may even strive to go so far as to procure an adequate material art-form for the spiritual idea; but it then steps beyond its proper sphere, and passes over into the higher stage of Sculpture. Its proper limit lies in the recognition of the spiritual as an inner reality, in contrast to its own external forms. It thus suggests the unseen life of the soul, as something different from what is materially presented in outward extension.

SCULPTURE.—By Architecture the inorganic world is purifed, symmetrically arranged, and brought into relation with the spirit; and the temple of the God as the house of his worshippers, stands complete. Into this temple, the Divinity enters as the lightning-flash of individuality strikes into and permeates the inert material mass. Thus does the infinite spiritual form, and not a mere outward connection of symmetry, concentrate and shape the corporeal. This is the function of SCULPTURE. That inner spirituality, to which Architecture is only able to point, is embodied by Sculpture in the sensible representation

of the external matter; and the two sides—the spiritual idea and the material form—are so harmonised with each other, that neither of them preponderates. Sculpture thus receives the *classical* form of Art as its fundamental type. In this sphere, every form of the sensible is also an expression of the spiritual. Hence, there is no spiritual subject that can be adequately represented by Sculpture but may be made entirely visible, in a corresponding bodily form. By Sculpture, the soul is represented, through the corporeal presentation, as in its own immediate unity and blessedness and repose. The outward form is vitalised by the infusion of spiritual individuality. The external sensible material is no longer elaborated, as in Architecture, merely according to its mechanical quality as an inert mass, nor in the forms of the inorganic world only, nor in entire indifference to colour. In Sculpture, matter is transfigured into the ideal forms of the human body, and through the whole of its dimensions as filling space. In this latter relation, it is the function of Sculpture, in the sphere of Art, to be the means of enabling the inward and spiritual to obtain a manifestation of its eternal rest and essential self-sufficiency. The only external correspondence to the inner repose and essential unity of the spiritual, must be found in what has a continuous being, in similar unity and repose. And this is Form, according to the abstract or general quality of space. The spiritual condition represented by Sculpture being that of the spirit as settled and composed, and not as distracted and dispersed in the manifold play of accidents and passions, the Artistic production does not modify the external into endless varieties of appearance and qualities in detail. It seizes only upon the one side of extension in space, in all its dimensions, as the medium of its representations.

FORM OF ROMANTIC ART.—Architecture having reared the temple, and the hand of the Sculptor having set in the statue of the God, the Community or congregation of worshippers now stands in presence of this perceptible form of the divinity in the wide halls of his house. Here, then, in the worshipping Assembly, is a spiritual reflection of that sensible image of Divine existence. It is the living inwardness and subjectivity of soul in the community, which now becomes the determining principle of Art, both in its subjects and in its material. This consequently imparts particularisation, individualisation, and inwardness to the forms of Art. The settled essential unity of the Divine presented in Sculpture, differentiates and separates into a plurality of individualised souls, whose unity is no longer sensible but ideal. And so the Divine becomes the living Spirit of the community, and is truly realised as a Spirit moving hither and thither, and passing forth and returning to itself again. This interchange between its own unity and the realisation of it in the consciousness of the individuals, proceeds through the formal stages of Universality, particularisation of what is involved in the universal and reunion of the manifold particulars. In this spiritual life of the community, the Divine is drawn forth from the abstractness of its undisclosed identity with itself, as well as from its immediate embodiment and immersion in corporeal form, as presented in Sculpture. It is now raised into spirituality and knowledge, in the reflecting mirror of consciousness, which is essentially inward and subjective. Thus a higher stage of spiritual life is attained; and the Spirit, in itself absolute, by this differentiation and division, appears at the same time as particular spirituality, or soul. And as it is not the calm wantless repose of the Divine in itself, but its being as in relation to

others, or its self-manifestation and appearing, that is now the main thing, the most manifold movement and activity in human form, comes into play. The sphere of artistic representation now embraces the varied individuality of human passion, action and event; and the wide domain of human feeling, willing and failing in general, furnishes its subjects. In accordance with the spiritual idea, the sensible material element of Art has, in like manner, to be particularised, and to become conformable to the inward consciousness. Such material is presented in Colours, Tones, and Words as mere designations of inner intuitions and images. When these are respectively used as the materials for realising that spiritual idea which has to be represented, we obtain the Arts of Painting, Music, and Poetry. The sensible material appears in these Arts, as particularised and idealised throughout; and the material forms thus come to correspond more closely to the spiritual ideas artistically represented by them. The spiritual meaning and the sensible material, as thus connected, attain to a higher and more inward permeation than was possible in Architecture and Sculpture. This inward unity is at last fully realised in the sphere of consciousness. But, in so far as form and matter must be here particularised and idealised, it can only be brought about at the sacrifice of objective universality in the subject of the representation, as well as of direct interfusion with the immediate material of sense.

Form and subject being now both raised into the sphere of spiritual ideality, Symbolical Architecture and the classical Ideal of Sculpture are both left behind. Hence the arts of Painting, Music, and Poetry, receive their type from the *Romantic* form of art, whose modes of formative expression they are specially adapted to exhibit. These Arts con-

stitute a whole by themselves, because the romantic form is distinctively the most concrete and complete in itself. The inner division of this *third* sphere of Art in its particular formations, has now to be unfolded.

PAINTING.—The first Art of the higher romantic form, and the one which stands next to Sculpture, is PAINTING. It uses as the material of its subjects and forms, the Visible as such, but particularised by differentiation into the visibility of Colour. The material of Architecture and Sculpture, is likewise visible and coloured; but in these Arts, the process of representation is not, as in Painting, confined to making the subject visible. In Painting, light in its simplicity, is the element employed, and being specialised in darkness as its opposite, and in union with it, it becomes Colour.

This subjectivised and idealised visibleness of Art, presents an advance in ideal independence. It no longer requires either the outward mechanical distinctions of massive, inert materiality, as in Architecture, nor the whole dimensions of sensible extension in space, as retained in Sculpture though concentrated into organic forms. The visibleness and the process of visibilising objects in Painting, present more ideal distinctions in the particularity of colours; and Art is thus so far liberated from the sensuous materiality of solid extension, and limited only by the dimension of surface. On the other side, the subject now obtains the widest particularisation in detail. Whatever may obtain place in the human breast as feeling, representation or purpose, and whatever man is capable of shaping into action, all this in endless variety, may be taken as the subject of Painting. The whole range of individual things, from the highest ideas of the mind down to the most individualised object of

nature, obtains a place. Even finite nature, in all its detail of scenery and appearances, may be exhibited in Painting, if there be only in the representation such allusion to any interest or element of the spiritual life as may ally it to human feeling and thought.

MUSIC.—The second Art by which the romantic form is realised, and the one next to Painting, is MUSIC. Its material, although still sensuous, advances to yet deeper consciousness and particularisation. The idealising of the materiality of sense by Music, proceeds upon recognition of the external outwardness of extended objects as separate from each other in space. Painting still allows the whole appearance of extendedness in objects to remain, and intentionally simulates it in the artistic representation. It is the function of Music further to overcome the externality of extended matter, and to idealise it into the individual unity of the point. In this relation a point is viewed as concretely and actively superseding material extension, and as the concentration of the movement and quivering of the inner parts of a material body within itself. Such beginning of the idealisation of matter, appears no longer as pictorial ideality in space, but as ideal movement in time. It shows itself as Sound, or more properly, as Tone; and as such, it presents a negative supersedure of sensible extended materiality. The aspect of visibility, has now become transformed into that of audibility; and Tone, as it were, releases the ideal element out of its confinement in the material. This first form of inwardness and animation within matter, furnishes corresponding material in the tonal forms, for the still indefinite innerness and subjectivity of the mind. Through the tones thus furnished, the soul sounds forth and resounds the whole scale of its

feelings and emotions. In this respect, just as Sculpture is a centre between Architecture and the subjective romantic Arts, so does Music again form the centre of the Romantic Arts as a whole. It thus constitutes the point of transition, between the extended sensuousness of Painting and the higher spirituality of Poetry. Like Architecture, Music involves, in the contrast of the feelings and their inner potentiality, the intellectual relations of quantity and figurative co-ordination.

POETRY.—The third and most spiritual representation of the romantic form of Art, is POETRY Its characteristic peculiarity lies in the power with which it subjects the sensible element, to the sway of the mind and its imaginings. It thus completes the liberation of Art, begun by Painting and Music. The tone or spoken sound which is the ultimate material element of poetry, is no longer in this Art the pure direct sensation of tone as such. It now becomes a mere *sign* which, while meaningless in itself, is used to represent definite mental ideas, and not mere shades and gradations of indefinite feeling. The sound or tone thus becomes articulated into *words*, whose function is to indicate cognitions and to designate thoughts. The negative point to which music advanced is developed into a completed definite point, appearing now as a spiritual point, or as an individual thing in consciousness. Ranging from itself outwards, it can represent the infinite space of perception combined with the time of tone. But this sensible element which, in Music, is still immediately one with feeling, is now separate and distinct from the inner idea in consciousness, which the mind within itself determines into particular images and representations. For the expression of these, it now uses the forms of tone in words, but only as signs of thought which are

meaningless and empty of themselves. Such spoken tones may accordingly be regarded as but letters, the audible like the visible being here lowered to a mere indication of the spiritual. Hence the special element of the representations of Poetry, is poetical imagination and spiritual intuitiveness; and as this is so far common to all the forms of art, Poetry moves through them all and develops itself independently in them. Poetry is thus the universal Art. It is the artistic expression of the spirit, become free in itself and bound no longer to the external material of sense for its realisation. It presents the mind as expatiating in the inner space and inner time of spiritual ideas and feelings. But on this its highest stage, Art now transcends itself. It leaves the artistic reconciliation of the spirit in the element of sense behind, and passes out of the Poetry of imagination into the Prose of thinking.

Such is the Division of the beautiful Arts, viewed as an organic whole. It embraces the external art of Architecture, the objective art of Sculpture, and the subjective arts of Painting, Music and Poetry. Many other divisions have been attempted; for the work of art is so rich in aspects, that now one side and again another has been adopted in dividing the subject.—Thus, the sensible Material has been taken as the ground of division. Architecture is then represented as the crystallisation of matter in Art. Sculpture becomes the organic figuration of matter in the whole of its sensible dimensions in space. Painting is the art of the coloured surface and line. In Music, space contracts into the self-filled point in time. And, lastly, in Poetry, the external material is reduced to insignificance and deprived of all mere natural value.—Again, the

distinctions in Art have been regarded from the view-point of their general relations to space and time And this abstract way of particularising the works of art, may be pursued consistently in reference to the specialities of the material. But it cannot be satisfactorily carried out as an ultimate ground of division, since it originates in a higher underlying principle, to which it must be accordingly reduced.

This higher Principle, as we have seen, divides the forms of Art into the Symbolical, the Classical, and the Romantic ; and these embody the universal constituent elements of the Idea of Beauty. Its relation to the several Arts in their concrete formations, is such that these Arts constitute the subsistence of the forms of Art in the real world. Symbolical Art attains its most proportionate reality and its greatest application in Architecture where it rules in conformity with its whole idea, and is not as yet reduced to a sort of inorganic nature accompanying another art. The Classical form of Art is Sculpture, in which it is presented in full completeness and reality, while it adopts Architecture only as an encircling and enclosing form, but cannot yet attain to the absolute expression of Painting and Music. The Romantic form of Art obtains the mastery of expression in Painting and Music and above all in Poetical Representation, in which forms Art becomes independent and absolute. Poetry, the highest of the Arts, is capable of expressing all the forms of the Beautiful; and it ranges over them all, because its proper element is the artistic phantasy, and phantasy is necessary for every production of Beauty to whatever form it may belong.

What the several Arts, by their very nature, realise in the individual works of art, is the universal

forms of the idea of Beauty as it unfolds itself in time. As the external realisation of this idea, there arises the wide Pantheon of Art, whose architect and builder is the spiritual life of the Beautiful becoming conscious of itself in the mind of man. But the completion of this world of Beauty can only be achieved in human history, through a development of thousands of years.

Part Second.

MICHELET'S PHILOSOPHY OF ART

AS

THE SCIENCE OF ÆSTHETICS.

The problem of the Philosophy of Art is to make the History of Art intelligible.—W. P. Ker.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ART.

INTRODUCTION.

ÆSTHETICS IN GENERAL.

ÆSTHETICS is the science of the Beautiful. The Beautiful is the representation of the Ideal, that is of a spiritual idea in a sensible, individual form. Art has for its object the production and realisation of the Beautiful, and the Philosophy of Art has to examine and explain the conditions of this process in relation to the highest objects and ends of human thought. The Beautiful exhibits in one of its spiritual manifestations the same eternal and absolute Being, which is also philosophically apprehended as the True and the Good. In an absolute system of thought, the Divine is realised in its essential ideas, through their successive stages of manifestation in Art, Religion, and Philosophy. It is in the spirit of such a system that the forms of the Beautiful in Art are to be here reviewed. And, at the outset, it is necessary to refer to certain preliminary points by way of introduction.

1. There are varieties in the forms of the Beautiful, and differences in the Arts that exhibit it in objects. These arise partly from the nature of the Ideal itself, and partly from the material

in which it is represented. The nature or subject of the Ideal is the first distinction that has to be considered, as it determines the inner idea or essential contents of the work of Art. Works of Art may be regarded as subjective, objective, or absolute, in the degree of the completeness and perfection with which they embody and contain their inherent or informing idea.—*Subjective* works of Art include all forms of the Beautiful exhibited in useful or industrial products. In these the beautiful idea or content is entirely limited, subsidiary, and finite, appearing merely in the external design and beautiful form of a common object, which serves as a means for the satisfaction of human wants. The end or final cause of such a work of Art, is confined to the mind of the individual as standing in a practical, utilitarian relation to the object.—In the *objective* work of Art—as represented by Music—the idea, as embodied in the sound or tone, is dependent upon the object, to which the mind stands essentially in a theoretical, contemplative relation. Here the inherent idea of the Beautiful, which of itself is infinite, is so far as possible, completely poured or transfused into the objective medium or vehicle, and the mind of the Artist or Beholder is only the form of activity by which the Ideal is unfolded or in which it is reproduced.—The *absolute* work of Art, which is the highest of all, is that in which the individual mind, although finite, rising to the consciousness of the infinite within itself, at once receives theoretically into itself the whole ideal content of the Beautiful, as presented in the objective work of Art, and at the same time again reproduces it out of itself. The mind thus becomes one with the active, living power and idea of the Beautiful. This is the highest stage and condition of mind attainable in Art. It is the absolute and perfect union of

practical design and theoretical contemplation, as realised in the spiritual creations of poetry, the highest of the Arts. It thus combines in principle and essence the lower utilitarian and objective forms. The work of Art, as such, furnishes the highest and purest pleasure, involving as it does a perfect activity realising its own end, and bringing with it the repose of the spirit in theoretical contemplation.

2. A further distinction in the Beautiful, rests upon the relation of the embodied ideal or spiritual idea to the material in which it is represented. Here the differences are determined by the predominance of the one or the other of the two sides; or by their being in equal proportion, so that there is a relation of equality and balance between them. In connection with this second distinction of the Beautiful, we have the historical development of Art, and this unfolds the different forms of Art.—First, the work of Art appears in a purely external and direct form,—the Beautiful being exhibited mainly in material objects. The thought or subjective ideal is, indeed, present; but it is in a manner sunk in the material, and is often exhibited only as an ornamentation on the form of the object. This appears especially in the *symbolical* work of art, in which the object is merely a symbol which more or less veils the thought it represents. This form of Art is mostly peculiar to the East.—Secondly, there comes the Greek form of art, which is characterised as the *classical*, from the beautiful proportion and harmony which it presents of thought and material, of matter and form. Here the beautiful idea controls the form of the material, and is not controlled by it as in the East,—the matter in its purity of form serving only to exhibit the Beautiful. And, thirdly, the *romantic* Art of the more modern world, is at once the highest form

of Art and the beginning of its dissolution. The Beautiful appears here as striving to unfold itself out of the limits of the material, and to transcend them, in order to realise itself in the abiding supremacy of the inner self-consciousness, whereby it passes from the form of intellectual perception into that of higher spiritual apprehension.

3. The last distinction in the Beautiful, regards the nature of the Material. In this connection, the movement of progress shews the material becoming always more idealised, and thus becoming always more proportionate to the form or ideal. This gives *the different Arts*, which constitute the objective division of Æsthetics. The material of the Arts, in order to be perceivable and intelligible, is taken from Nature, which, however, in its character, always approaches nearer to the nature of the spiritual. The first material of the Beautiful in art is matter as given in space, with its physical dimensions, and this is transformed by *the formative Plastic Arts*. Above this external material in space, there is another of a more subjective kind in time, namely, sound or tone, which is produced by the vibrations of matter. This gives rise to *Music*, or Art in tone, which is realised by sensation rather than by perception. Lastly, we have a special subjective material in the representative imagination, which possesses the objectivity of space in the form of the mental representation, and which furnishes material for *Poetry* as Art in Speech. This third division of the Beautiful of Art, is not to be viewed as entirely apart and separate from the other two; but is rather to be regarded as the supreme form of Art, and as having the others involved in it.

The various Arts—the so-called Fine Arts—as producing and realising the Beautiful, may thus be divided into Formative Art, Music, and Poetry, as the

speaking art. The higher arts involve the lower and arise out of them. Formative Art, in its first stage of Architecture, sprang from the subjective need of a habitation; then came Sculpture and Painting. The term Plastic Art, though usually restricted to Sculpture, the central Formative Art, may be extended generally to indicate the figurative character of this whole group of Arts. Music, as developed in singing and theatrical representation, implies these formative arts, and in its developed forms it also involves the elements of the higher work of art—the absolute, speaking art, Poetry. These individual Arts have had a historical development in the various formations and products of art, which have so far survived the process of the past, and remain for contemplation. Plastic Art shone conspicuously in the first of its three stages as *Architecture*, especially in the East; in its second stage, as *Sculpture*, in Greece; and in its third stage, as *Painting*, in Christendom. *Music* has also celebrated its highest triumphs in Christian countries. *Poetry*, as the speaking art, belongs to all countries and to all times.

I.—FORMATIVE ART.

ARCHITECTURE, SCULPTURE, PAINTING.

FORMATIVE, plastical or figurative Art presents the ideal in space to the eye. It takes as its basis the extended matter of nature with its three dimensions in space, and thus makes the sensible material the bearer or vehicle of the spiritual form which appears in it as the Beautiful. This relation of matter and form is variously exhibited by the plastical arts in their particular products. When the matter of the work of art so predominates that the form only appears as an external adornment of it, we have Architecture which is pre-eminently the symbolical mode of plastical art. When with the three dimensions of space still retained, the form rises into equilibrium with the matter so that they are in equal proportion in the work of art, the Plastic production becomes Sculpture, and is classical. Finally, when the form attains to such supremacy over the material that it obtains a spiritual preponderance over the matter employed and reduces it to a surface of two dimensions, plastical art becomes romantic in Painting.

I.—ARCHITECTURE.

Architecture begins at the point where the artistic effort which has been subserving the practical wants, passes into the objective work of

art, and exhibits a free ideal. At the outset, the Architectural idea was satisfied with furnishing a protected and protecting roof, as a shelter from the inclemencies of the weather. And as wood was the most convenient material available for this purpose, all Architecture started with the wooden building. Gradually the Art advanced from this formal subserviency to mere wants, and it became independent, but under the inherent limitation of not possessing the power to exhibit the Ideal in a spiritual manner in itself. On account of the preponderance of matter in its proper works of art, Architecture can only attain to a production of the Beautiful in the external form of the regularity or symmetry of its object, or to a representation of the Sublime in the control of a material mass. At its highest it seeks the aid of Sculpture, and even makes use of Painting, in order to reduce the massiveness of its material to the form required for receiving an ideal figure, or to adapt it for holding a devout assembly of worshippers. Architecture, as a whole, passes through three stages or forms of Art. In the East, it is symbolical; in Greece, it is classical; and in Christendom, it is romantic.

A.—SYMBOLICAL ARCHITECTURE.

The Oriental Architecture extends to Babylon and India, but it is mainly Egyptian. Originally, and in the rudest times, it furnished dwellings for the living in subterranean excavations. In Egypt, it came to provide not only for the housing of the living but also of the dead. The pyramids contain the tombs of the Kings and of sacred animals; and their passages indicate the migrations of the soul after death. The Egyptian temples likewise enclosed the abode of their divinity. But these abodes were mere apartments vanishing into

insignificance, when compared with the extraordinary vastness of the whole buildings. Thus the temple while containing the chamber of the god, did not lose the characteristic of independence, for apart from this destination, it was surrounded with great rows of pillars and sphixes leading up to it. Its symbolical character was shewn, however, in the enormous labour required to obtain the mastery over the material, indicating the struggle of the spirit to develop itself out of and above the material world. This Symbolism is still more expressly embodied in the windings of the Labyrinth, which represent the courses of the stars. The same is seen in the seven squares upon which the tower of Belus rested, and in the seven circular walls enclosing the sun-tower at Ecbatana, in both of which structures may be clearly recognised an indication of the ancient number of the planets. Again the obelisks or memnonic pillars, are symbols of the rays of the sun. The buildings at Persepolis, in like manner, were symbols of the centre of the Good, outwards from which the Kingdom of Light spread to a wide circumference over all the peoples. Further, the Indian temples with the Lingam, are symbols of the reproductive power of nature. The tower of Babel, according to the Jewish myth, was the symbol of the gathering of the whole human race in one, with one language. Finally, we may perceive in the Muhammedan mosques with their bareness and absence of sensuous ornament, a symbol of the abstract thought which is represented as the Absolute.

B.—CLASSICAL ARCHITECTURE.

In the Classical Architecture, the process of building is again restored to the original purpose from which it started, namely, that of subserving and

ministering to practical wants. But while the Symbolical Architecture struggled out of the service of lower finite wants, in order to attain to complete independence, the Classical Architecture combined such service with the freedom which is proper to the Beautiful. In the classic form, beauty is not infused merely into the image of the divinity to which the temple serves as a dwelling, but is shed over the temple itself, whereas the characteristics of beauty are wanting both in the Egyptian idol and its dwelling-place, both of them being distorted and confused. In Greece, on the other hand—according to the judgment of Herodotus—we have, in place of the gigantic and sublime, the relatively small and fair. Moreover, the beauty of the Grecian temple, notwithstanding its subservient character, was of such a kind that it could have no peculiar contents in it, such as the symbolical structures with all their sublimity always possessed. Its beauty consisted in its external form, which exhibited a rhythmic harmony and regular proportion throughout, and which appeared most distinctly in straight lines and right angles. The Greek temples were regular oblongs, most of them half as broad as they were long. The shrine of the god, was enclosed by anterior and posterior courts or porticos. Around this inner sanctuary was a wall, and as a wider enclosure, there was a colonnade or peristyle of pillars, or sometimes there was this alone. To enclose, to support, or to be supported, were the three auxiliary modes in which the Classical Architecture showed itself as ministering to the Divine.

The Column, as the supporting element, is evolved, like the trunk of a tree, from the organic world; but in the West it does not approach the vegetable form so closely as in the East. In Greece, it found its complete development as a means of support, and

did not continue to retain the characteristic of an independent organism. It became circular in form, because the circle is the simplest of the lines enclosed in itself. The organic element appeared in growth only in ornamental embellishment on the Capital. The old Etrurian or Tuscan Column is the crudest, appearing, as it does, without any base, and growing, as it were, directly out of the ground. The orders known as the Doric, the Ionian and the Corinthian, are distinguished by their relatively greater slimness, and by the distance of the separate pillars, as well as by the fluting or channelling and the increasing development in detail of the base and of the capital, from the plain moulding of the convex coil or ovolo to the floral decorations. By this development, the column appears with a proper beginning and ending, and as a whole complete in itself. It supports the Architrave or principal beam. The Architrave while being supported, again supports other parts, namely, the frieze, the pediments, and the roof; and this supporting relation is made manifest in the protruding frieze by the Triglyphs or arabesqued heads of the cross-beams, with the Metopes lying between them. The Roof has generally two sides meeting above in an obtuse angle, and thus signifying that there is nothing more to be supported, which would not have been apparent, had it been flat.

The Roman Architecture with its arches and curvatures, formed the transition to the Christian Architecture. In the Pantheon, the central sanctuary of the baths of Agrippa, it presents the transition to the utilitarian Architecture that ministers to limited ends, as it appears in amphitheatres, theatres, country villas with parks, etc. The Greek theatres, on the other hand, were originally temples, in which theatrical representations were produced at the festivals of Bacchus.

The games in the circus and elsewhere at Rome, had also originally a connection with the worship of the Manes, as shown by the sacrifices offered to the Dead.

C.—ROMANTIC ARCHITECTURE.

By the Romantic Architecture, is meant the so-called Gothic or Christian Architecture of the Middle Ages. It combines the design and utility of the Greek Architecture, with the independence of the Oriental. It does not minister so directly to the housing of the Divine as does the Classical Architecture. But while producing an entirely enclosed building, as a Cathedral or Church, it may include within it a sacred picture, that the assembly of worshippers may rise through their spiritual concentration before it to the Infinite. The devotional spirit of the congregation thus determines the form of the church as the house of God, which is no longer limited, like the Greek temple, merely for the reception of an image, but requires larger room as the gathering-place of the believers for worship. And in this, notwithstanding the resistance of the material masses, it represents the effort of the spirit to pass beyond extended matter and to rise above the finite.

The *means* employed to overcome and control these material masses, are mainly three. In the first place, an infinite variety of small *Ornamentations*—generally of organic forms—are added to fill up the vast surfaces of the walls; and thus their huge dimensions to some extent disappear. Again, the *Spires* towering into the infinite of the heavens above, by their appearance of striving upwards, further aid to overcome the mere massiveness of the earthly material. The extraordinary vastness of the design of these magnificent works,

explains the fact that so many of them have remained unfinished. Even the Strassburg Cathedral wants one of its towers, and the Cathedral of Cologne has only of late been completed by the devotees of romantic art. The third means employed, is the multiplication of smaller pillars or shafts branching out of the main columns and growing heavenwards, by which the shadowy dimness and awe of the old German forests, are reflected in a chiaroscuro, which is further heightened by the stained glass windows. The solemnity and sublimity thus produced, stir the soul and lead it, in the devotional spirit of our forefathers, to apprehend the Supersensible.

While the Greek colonnades which ran round the temple, maintained their relation to the outer world, the Gothic columns and pillars were transferred to the interior of the building, on account of its idea of seclusion from the surrounding world. The principal interior pillars thus formed and surrounded the *Nave*, the *Choir*, and the *Aisles*. The central nave or body of the church with the cross-wings, imitate the cross, the chief symbol of Christianity. The inner form of the building, which is the most important part, only appears generally through the external outlines which are subservient to it, whereas in the Greek temple, the outward side is artistically the main object.

Through the *pointed* Gothic arch of the Christian Churches, the function of support in the Greek system—also shown in the *round* Roman arch—becomes much less noticeable. Everything is now free, as indicated in the ascending and aspiring outlines, in the springing and shooting upwards of the parts, and in the convergence of the whole in the highest point above. The transition from the Roman to the Gothic Architecture, was formed by the Basilica, the Byzantine Rotunda, and the

horse-shoe Arch of the Arabians. Since the close of the Middle Ages, and in modern times, we have a mixture of all the styles, from the time of Michael Angelo, who, in St Peter's at Rome, set the rotunda of the Pantheon, as a dome, on the Byzantine Basilica.

II.—SCULPTURE.

The art of the Sculptor embodies the spiritual idea in the work of art as its whole ideal essence, and not merely as an external veiling or decoration. The spiritual design entirely determines and pervades the material object. This design is, therefore, derived from the organic products of nature, and, more particularly from that body in which the spirit directly dwells. The human body is the highest organism, and the one in whose form the universal spirit has now its adequate sensible expression. The *classical ideal* is represented in the form of the human body as expressing the indwelling spirit. Its direct representation is, thus, the main thing in Sculpture; whereas in Architecture the symbolical character is still predominant. But as the Greek art was essentially classical, Sculpture attained its highest development in Greece, while the Symbolical and Christian Sculpture are related to it only as a precursor and an offshoot. What is accidental and variable in the expression of the face, as in the play of the features, as well as the mere subjectivity of the emotions, are excluded from the classical Ideal. Only the universal characteristics of the spirit so far as present, and in the individual, are represented. The highest object of Sculpture is, therefore, one of those universal characteristics which may be embodied permanently in a single statue, as representing the undisturbed repose of

the Divine. But the individual statue may also advance to the representation of action. This holds still more of the *Group*, which may represent the human in any variety of action and even include the lower animals. Finally, in the form of *Reliefs*, Sculpture begins to approach to Painting, and the third dimension shrinks into comparative insignificance. Sculpture thus becomes a means for the realisation of the ends of Architecture, in its application to the ornamentation of temples, as on the external pediments, friezes and walls. It may even be used for the decoration of useful and private works of art, as seen, for example, on the sarcophagus.

A.—ORIENTAL SCULPTURE.

The Egyptian images of the deities remained stationary, without development or progress, so that the same types were maintained for thousands of years. They were wanting in freedom of movement and individualisation of the Ideal. Modifications of situations and actions, were left unrepresented by them. The arms and legs lie close to the body, and the head is lacking in the expression of spirituality. The symbolism appears in the manner in which the human head struggles out of the animal form, as in the Sphinx; or, commonly, a human form has still an animal head. The veiled figure at Sais is, in like manner, a symbol of that spiritual knowledge which is not yet openly disclosed. Hegel sees in Isis, with the Horus upon her bosom, not the true expression of the feeling of maternal love, but the sensible sign of passionless thought. The striving of the spirit to rise above the natural, is but imperfectly compensated by the colossal size of the statues, or by unlovely distortions of nature, as when Isis is represented with

a thousand breasts as the symbol of fertility. Representations of individual life are also presented by the Oriental Sculpture, but they appear mostly in the form of particular details of action, as in the beautifully preserved *bas reliefs* from Assyria in the British Museum, where campaigns, royal hunts, etc., alternate with figures of fish-deities and such like.

B.—GREEK AND ROMAN SCULPTURES.

In contrast to the stationary character of the Oriental Sculpture, the Classical Sculpture passes through a development. Thus we see on the Etrurian vessels, an overflowing though merely sensuous animation in the figures, which often passes into portraiture with prosaic details. On the other hand, the works of art from Aegina, which represent the struggle before Troy, with the figures of Achilles, Ajax, Hector, and others, show reproductions of the body that are very faithful to nature. The heads, however, which recall the Egyptian manner, are not individualised, and the attitudes of the warriors are angular, stiff and cold.

The ideal Sculpture of the Greeks rose to the highest in the pure forms of the gods, which, without disturbing situations, represented such universal moral characters as Zeus, the father of the gods, Apollo, the leader of the Muses, Aphrodite, the goddess of love, and Athene the warlike goddess of wisdom. These presented permanent fixed types determined by their spiritual character, and yet they left the artist room enough for individual creations of his own. Thus, to take an example, the Venus-idea traversed five stages. First, she is represented as Anadyomene, just emerged from the sea, with moist hair, of which we

have a Greek specimen in the Venus of the Albani palace. Then follows the Venus Bathing, with a jar of ointment, as in the Masks of the Vatican cabinet. Thirdly, she appears as Venus Urania, in the form of a virgin who has just stepped out of the bath, of which we have the celebrated example of the Venus de Medicis at Florence, the highest perfection of the ideal. To this stage also belonged the draped form of Cos by Praxiteles. Fourthly, we have the Venus Victrix at Naples, and at Paris the Venus of Milo conquering Mars by love. And lastly, there was the Venus Vulgivaga as in the Capitoline figure found in the Suburra at Rome, as also the Venus Kallipygos.

The Material of the sculptural work of art, passes from black or red stone in Egypt, through the gold and ivory of Phidias, to white marble as the perceptible element which, from its pure relation to light, corresponds most closely to the nature of the spirit. The Greeks, however, often painted the marble, and put precious stones in the cavities of the eyes. Yet even then, the look always remained stiff and did not become soul-like. The beauty of the Ideal appears in classical Sculpture, specially in the representation of the sensible form of the body.

Groups, Situations, Actions, Bas-reliefs, also appear in the Classical Sculpture, but without stepping beyond certain limits, since they express only what is universal in the particular spiritual idea represented. Thus in the Niobe group at Florence, even the mother's agony and the children's defiance of the slaughtering gods, exhibit only what is ideal and universal. In like manner, the birth of Minerva, on one of the pediments of the Parthenon, represents only the universal outline of the Athenian history, from the rising courser of the dawn, to the evening of its greatness, as indicated in the descending courser of the sunset. The con-

flict of the Athenians and Centaurs on the Metopes, further shows us the victory of the spirit over the natural, the barbarian. Finally on the bas-reliefs on the interior of the Parthenon, we see the general life of Athens, as it is presented to us with its many-sided activity in the procession of the Panathenaeum.

In the Roman Sculpture, on the other hand, the Ideal falls more and more into the background. Thus in the many statues of the Emperors, the interest of mere portraiture predominates. The world-pain of Rome, as exhibited in the group of the Laokoon, which was produced in the age of Nero, is in strong contrast to the ideal pain of the Niobe. The Farnese Bull, which belongs to the later Greek art of the Rhodian School, represents an action which is quite unideal in itself,—the jealousy and revenge of a woman directed against the mistress of her husband.

C.—CHRISTIAN SCULPTURE.

The Romantic Sculpture goes further than the Classical, and as far as the material allows, in the representation of the inner states of the spirit and individual particularisation in detail. In the religious sphere, we see an example of this in Michael Angelo's Mary lamenting over the dead Christ on her bosom, in St Peter's; and again in the remarkable Boromeo skinned figure at Milan. The whole of the Christian history is thus represented in wood, marble and metal; but, for the most part, only in ornamentations of Architecture, as in niches, on fonts and such like. To the same category belong the thousands of statues on the towers of the Milan Cathedral, the recumbent figures on tombs and similar subjects. Our present sculpture either imitates the Greek, as in the Venus of Canova and Danneker's

Ariadne; or it is engaged in portraiture, as in busts. Almost more than in Greece, it is made subservient to the commemoration of political and religious events, in numerous monuments, such as the Luther monument at Worms by Ritschl.

The highest artistic representation of the spirit as in the depths of its inner consciousness, is, however, only attained in the three last arts, Painting, Music and Poetry, which we may call by pre-eminence, the Romantic Arts. Painting, laying aside the third dimension, takes only a surface as material for its representations; Music entirely escapes from the limitation of space, and Poetry as the universal art of all interests and times, is not confined even within the bounds of these lower romantic forms.

III.—Painting.

Painting proceeds upon apprehension of the absolute, as mind or subjectivity, but it is still defective in its expression, in so far as the subject appears in sensible form. And this holds both of the infinite Divine subject, and of the finite human subject. The picture, however, is not limited in its sensible side, like the Greek statue, to the mere outward beauty of the human form, which is only an objective expression of the mind. The expression now becomes of a subjective nature, shewing itself, on the one hand, in actions with the individualisation of character and of situation, as well as breadth of grouping, and, on the other, in the features as displaying inwardness of feeling and depth of soul in the animated look of the eye, etc.

As everything cannot be here embodied in the mere sensible form, the spirit is suggested in the midst of this external appearance as an in-

ternal power which finds in the external form only the means of its manifestation. Painting begins, in this way, to pass beyond the bounds of figurative art, as not merely exhibiting the spirit, in a beautiful appearance, but as also indicating its inner, essential nature.

Hence the material of Painting is of a more purely ideal kind. This is colour which strives to imitate the relations of the third dimension of space upon only one surface, on which other surfaces are indicated in perspective by means of light and shade and the mere drawing of lines. The Chinese Painting which knows no perspective, can, therefore hardly be regarded as painting; and the same may be said of the encaustic painting of the Greeks which still retains the third dimension. While Painting, on account of its predominating subjectivity, is eminently romantic in general character, yet taken in its development as a whole, it presents the three successive forms of symbolical, classical and romantic art, in the Byzantine, Italian and Germanic painting.

A.—BYZANTINE PAINTING.

The Byzantine Painting moves mainly in the religious sphere and exhibits the forms of the dogmas of the Church, without, however, infusing into them inwardness of soul. Instead of representing the divineness of the form by the expression of the features, the divinity is only indicated symbolically by the golden background of the picture and the aureole surrounding the head. The Byzantine Painting still rests largely on the antique, gives to heathen forms a Christian meaning, and introduces Christian symbols, such as the lamb, the dove, the vine, by way of mere ornamentation. In all this, its characteristic is to be typical and

unprogressive; and the completed type stiffens into lifelessness and aridity, so that the art of the painter frequently sank to the level of the mechanical, although the technical details were executed with care. In the stone-painting of the Mosaics, especially, the expression is still void of animation. Yet the antique form is gradually laid aside. The divine representations, such as Christ and Mary, remain, however, little better than mummies or shadows, their woe-wornness being the indication of their holiness. In the crucifixions, the tortures of a cruel death are exhibited just as the later Greeks were wont to see them with their own eyes. The human is presented only in scenes of martyrdom. 'The surroundings of nature,' says Hegel, 'and the picturesqueness of a background, are awanting. Modulation by light and shade, brightness and darkness, and their fusion, as well as perspective and the art of life-like grouping, attained either no development at all, or at most a very scant beginning.' And as Hotho, in his history of painting, has said, 'the Byzantine painting has been brought to bear upon the Slavonic races, but they have not been able to carry its development further forward.'

B.—ITALIAN PAINTING

The Italian Painting is distinguished in comparison with the Byzantine, by the progress made in the spiritualisation of its subjects. Thus in its representations of the crucifixion of Christ, as Hegel remarks, it immediately puts the idea of the victory of the spiritual in place of the mere overthrow of the corporeal. The Greek mythology is still drawn into the circle of the Christian representations, while the national history and landscapes are but rarely used. Instead of the

symbolical, there appears the classical beauty of the sensible form. Into the beautiful presentations, there is infused the religious fervour of the heart and soul, so that the harmony of the inner and outer is realised. But the Italian Painting comes only gradually to this perfection.

1.—The first period of the Italian Painting is represented principally by the *Tuscan* School. The oldest masters began by reviving the later Greek painting, but as far as possible, softening the crudeness of its austerity in their own spirit. The advance is made into what is human and individual, and this is conformed to the religious ideas which it is used to express. The religious circle still continues to supply the chief subjects. But in the place of God the Father, whose representation predominates among the Byzantines, there comes now the human exhibition of the Divine in Christ and Mary, although they are still frequently transported to heaven, and the whole scene is not unfrequently laid in the celestial world. The representations in detail are immediately taken from life. The elaboration of the artist is directed to the naturalness of the corporeal appearance, and to the exhibition of definite characters, actions, passions, situations, attitudes, and movements. The circle of objects is now enlarged. The life and sufferings of Christ and the history of the Saints are presented. The highest piety and fervour of the soul in faith, dominate the naturalness and beauty of the presentation. And even the reconciliation of the external reality with the internal spirit, is not awanting. Picturesque backgrounds now appear and give natural surroundings. Giotto and Angelico da Fiesole are the chief representatives of this period of art. The latter, especially, as

Hotho observes, expresses with the greatest fidelity to the truth of nature, the deep fervour of religiousness and the earnestness of the moral life.

2.—The highest fusion of the fuller reality of life with the inner religiousness of the soul, appears in the *Umbrian* school. Perugino, the teacher of Raphael, presents the transition from the first into this second period. In Raphael, it attains its perfection. The bodily form becomes more animated and vital, and thus it appears both in the inward and outward relation as harmoniously beautiful. The complete interfusion and permeation of these elements and consequently the culmination of classical painting was attained by Raphael. This was achieved by his not merely imitating the ideal beauty of the ancient sculpture, but by his bringing this beauty, in the expression of the highest religious emotion, into the representation of the life and depth of the individual soul.

3.—Leonardo da Vinci, of the *Lombard* School, introduced the third stage of the Italian art. Without surrendering the dignity furnished by reverence for the value and truth of religion, Leonardo, by his thorough knowledge of the forms of the human body, added the expression of sweet joyfulness in gestures and graceful movements. Correggio is even more successful in depicting gracefulness of soul in his forms and groupings. Titian of the *Venetian* school, is still greater in the glow and warmth and power of his colouring. In Paul Veronese and the Carraccis of the school of Bologna, there appears a greater breadth and extension of material and a closer approach to the sphere and forms of the earthly or secular life. Thus this last

period constitutes the transition to the German schools.

The other *Romanic* schools are connected in their development with the Italian painting. The *Spanish* school ranges between the extremes of the austerest religiousness and the reproduction of the commonest reality. The *French* school is, of all the Romanic offshoots, the most many-sided, moving at once in the religious, worldly, and individual spheres; while in landscape it has perhaps achieved the highest in Claude Lorraine, a spiritual mood being always infused by him into nature and made to shine through his pictures.

C.—GERMANIC PAINTING.

The Germanic schools, again, depart from the classical beauty of the Italians, and as in them the spirit transcends the form, they constitute the properly romantic development of Painting. Depth of feeling and fervour of faith is their main object, and these are combined with a more developed particularity of individual character. The subject of representation is not so essentially the Divine as contained in the object worshipped, but rather the mode and manner in which it is humanly apprehended as exhibited in the expression of piety and humility in the worshippers. At the same time the side of the mundane reality and the cares of life out of which this piety struggles, are kept in view.

1. The Netherland *Flemish* School, founded by the Van Eycks, the inventors of painting in oil, presents the beginning of this development. To great mastery in drawing, grouping, composition and colouring, there is conjoined the whole riches of the surroundings of Nature. This latter element always appears more strongly in the later masters

of the school, whereas the religious circle of ideas predominated at the outset.

2. The *High German School* departs still further from the forms of classical beauty, so that it represents even the most repulsive scenes of martyrdom. But, on the other hand, as shewn in Holbein's Madonnas, it seeks to embody the classical beauty of the Italians, without surrendering depth of religious feeling. Its subjects are often votive pictures, in which are expressed the gratitude of the spectators in worship; for instance, in view of a benefit bestowed by the Virgin.

3.—The *Dutch School* represents the complete embodiment of life in the real world, and so attains in its subjects to the highest freedom. The utmost freedom of the movement of painting, is also here realised in the exercise of the art for its own sake. This school pre-eminently represents man, and what is purely human in him. Its subjects embrace the cheerful consecration of a church, the liveliness of a rustic dance, or the heartiness of an inn, with satin dresses, landscapes, sea-pieces, animals and flowers,—in short, all the variations of *Genre* and Still-life.

II.—MUSICAL ART.

Music as Art in Tone.

In Painting the artistic appearance, in which the inner spiritual sense of beauty exhibits itself, still possesses a material character and subsistence. But if the subjectivity of the soul is to be expressed in a wholly adequate manner, the extended presentation to the eye must be overcome in all its dimensions and superseded. This may be accomplished by taking succession in time as the element of the artistic representation. It is naturally presented in *Sound* as the quivering or vibrating of matter, and at the same time the dissolving or negating of its material extension. The Beautiful is thus represented in Music, which is the Art for the ear. The objectivity of the Beautiful becomes here entirely subjective and transitory, but at the same time it lays hold of the whole soul. And because the feeling produced by Music ranges in its variations from the absolutely undetermined to the infinitely determinable, we have therein the ground of the immeasurable power of this art and its irresistibly inspiring influence, especially among uncivilised peoples whose habits of thought are still little developed. We have here, in fact, only the responsive thrilling or quivering of the soul which is its feeling, and as such the material is not distinguishable from its form—the thing felt and

the feeling being the same. The whole basis of the musical expression is thus merely this self-moving inward feeling of the mind. Hence the characteristic of the highest subjective freedom belongs to Music.

In Music the feelings advance indeed out of their indefiniteness to more definite intuitions and representations, but these are born of the soul itself, and the tones only give them impulse and occasion. It thus becomes a self-production and projection of the soul as soul, when under the influence of the sensations of tone it realises the feelings of joyfulness, cheerfulness, sorrow, longing; or rises to love, reverence or worship. As the external material elements of music are only a succession of vibrations in time, so the inner feelings exhibit themselves as merely a series of vibrating states produced in response as on the inward key-board of the soul.

But in order that the crude natural tone may become available as a medium for the artistic expression of musical feeling, its natural quality, which is the quantitative modification of a succession in time, has to be variously transformed. This is effected by introducing measure and proportion, which are qualitative distinctions, into the varying duration of time. The musical tone is thus completed and perfected in three modes and forms. (1)—In the first place, the Measure comes in as a regular relation in the length or shortness of the duration of the tones, giving *Time* and *Rhythm*, and constituting thereby the architectonic outline of the Music. (2)—Secondly, the quality of the inner relation of the tone is introduced into the external quantitative sound and when adequately expressed this gives *Harmony*, which may be regarded as the classical side of Music. (3)—And thirdly, the spirit of *Melody*, which combines the

two former elements, is embodied in the tones as the pure internal soul of the Music, and this may be called its Romantic form.

I.—TIME AND RHYTHM.

In the Time and Rhythm of the Music, the tone does not yet pass beyond its quantitative character as a mere measure of duration in time. But even thus, it is already capable of artistic expression, just as Architecture, though not yet absolutely exhibiting the qualitative character of the mind, gives it manifestation as shining through the regular divisions of space and the symmetry of the extended proportions. The same holds in Music of the relations of time, as in Architecture of those of space. Time represents ideality in the outer world, as soul does in the inner world. The two thus correspond, though presented in wholly opposite elements. Music, while giving expression to the inward thrilling of the states of the soul in the outward vibration of the tones, brings out the contrast between the cold intellectual distinctions in time and the simultaneous responding glow of the feelings within, and it artistically combines in its beautiful forms these two extremes with each other.

On account of the differences in the length or duration of the natural tones, this combination can, however, only be attained by introducing into them the unity of the mind, which is done by raising these differences by symmetry to equality. Were a simple unity of an outward kind alone adopted, such as the quantitative equality of the tones in their duration according to the scale, only a general mechanical unity, and not a spiritual unity, would thus arise out of the elemental differences. In order to avoid this, certain combinations

are produced, such as making four tones, each a fourth in duration, equal to the unity of a whole tone, and using these as two equal unities, according to the formula $1 = \frac{4}{4}$. Such a concrete series composed of tones in elements of unequal duration but forming together each an equal unity, constitutes the Measure of the music, every individual part containing such an equal unity. In Architecture the unequal sections of space are thus equalised by regularity and symmetry. When in one of the wholes the tones are of somewhat shorter duration than in another, the Pause again brings the difference to Equality. In this unity and uniformity, says Hegel, the soul finds its satisfaction because it recognises its own nature in them, whereas this relation does not inherently belong to natural things, such as the motions of the heavenly bodies. It is Art which thus reduces dissimilarity to uniformity.

The Measures or modes of time are distinguished from each other by the individual members of the measure containing either a whole note or only fractions of a note as in four-fourths (the common four crotchets) or three-fourths or six-eighths time, and by having the Accent, which belongs still to the merely quantitative relation, on particular places. This latter element gives the Rhythm, with regard to which it may be noted that the accent of the verse must not run counter to that of the music, although it is not necessary for them absolutely to coincide. Finally, the destinctions of *Piano*, *Forte* and *Allegro*, which serve for the expression of different feelings, only represent quantitative differences and are therefore related to this part of the subject.

II.—HARMONY.

In harmony, the inner nature or qualitative form of the tone comes into the artistic repre-

sentation, and appears in the height and depth of the tones. In the variations of the scale the qualitative movement of the notes continues uniform in tone, as was the case with the quantity of the time. While the numbers of the vibrations according to their proportion or diversity, produce qualitatively different notes, the quality of the material has also an influence in modifying the tone. Thus a surface vibrates and sounds otherwise than a line, and a straight surface than a crooked, as is shewn by the different sounds of a drum and a bell. A pipe again vibrates differently according as it presents a movable pillar of air as in wind instruments or has a fixed form as in stringed instruments; but it sounds most beautifully as the human voice because this combines both these kinds of tone.

It has been proved by experiments in Natural Philosophy that the simplest relations in the number of vibrations furnish the most pleasing harmonies to the ear, as in the natural harmonic notes known as the octave or eighth, the third, the fourth, and the fifth; whereas seconds and sevenths which have the quantitative relations of 8 to 9 and 8 to 15, are in discord with these other tones. The modifications of tone designated the keys, thus arise according as the one or the other tone is taken as the fundamental tone or key-note. By the introduction of semi-tones or half-tones, the keys are distinguished into Major and Minor, to which there correspond different modes of feeling, as sorrow and mourning or joy and exultation. But it is only when the music passes beyond mere uniformity in the succession of high and deep notes as in the scale, to the introduction of various dissimilar tones in the series, that the system of Harmony proper arises in the chords. Among the according harmonies the triad or threefold concord

which consists of Key-note, Mediant or third, and Dominant or fifth, is the simplest, and upon this accord the music of the ancients rested. Logically this may be represented as an identity of differences. By the introduction of the seconds and sevenths, the differences become contrasts or opposites, and thereby the corresponding feelings pass into sharpness, laceration and pain, especially in the Accords or harmonies of the sevenths and ninths. Then it remains to resolve this antagonism and to restore the dissonances or discords to harmony. The last interest of harmony is, therefore, not the mere scale of the qualitatively different individual notes, but that of whole chords and Accords; and with this the transition is made to other modifications of tone.

III.—MELODY.

In the combination of all these elements—Measure, Time, Rhythm, Keys, Accords, Consonances, Dissonances, and their Resolution—Melody finds the means of giving expression to the inward spirituality of the feelings. Melody is the soul-speech of Music, and it may be used without being pedantically fettered by the rules of harmony. It is, therefore, onesided to regard Harmony as the most essential element of all, as is the case in the music of Wagner. But, on the other hand, it is also erroneous to lay all the importance upon Melody so that it may be freed from all the regulating limitations of harmony, as is the case in the music of some of the Italians. This gives rise to mere arbitrariness in the manner of treatment and to capricious movements and whimsical variations in the music.

As regards the spiritual ideal, contained or represented in all these modes of musical expression,

it is more or less of indefinite character, as in the former arts, because the feelings are naturally indeterminate, though determinable. Hence Music can stand in a subservient relation to poetry, and accompany its representations with the feelings corresponding to them. This union is realised in the form of *Vocal Music*, as in the Song, the Opera, and the Oratorio. In each of these it is but rational that the music should correspond to the poetical matter, in which some see a want of freedom in the Music. But the view that Music thus loses its freedom is erroneous, since it thus only exhibits in its own element the free effusion of the corresponding feelings into which it translates the poetical representations. In this union of poetry and music we would rather recognise the classical correspondence of spirit and expression; and when the music is so fused with the poetry into one whole, it becomes through the feelings it evokes, an expression of thought. We find this realised in the classical music of the Germans, such as Mozart and Gluck. It must be regarded as an eccentricity, as in Rossini, when a tragical situation in an opera is accompanied with a dance to a merry melody. In the *Recitative*, a closer conjunction of the tones with the sense is allowed, but this approximation on the part of the music is not to be carried into mere imitation of the natural sounds in the notes, although we have for example, the reproduction of thunder and the bleating of sheep in Haydn's Oratorio of the 'Creation.'

At the same time, we may reckon it the highest freedom of Music when it can become independent, and, without the aid of a text, give expression to musical thought by itself alone. This is realised by *Instrumental Music*, and in this form the symphonies of Beethoven have achieved the highest perfection, in the essential depth of the feelings they

express. Yet even instrumental music, on account of the essential want of definiteness in its representations, is only too apt to yield to arbitrariness in manner. At this point the objective work of art may, however, at the very highest become absolute from its inner perfectness. It depends very materially upon the skill and genius of the performing artist, whether he will infuse soul into the tones he calls forth or produce them quite mechanically. In the former case, the instrument becomes a living organ, as the Violin became in the hands of Paganini, when, for instance on the G string, he drew forth the expression of ebullitions of pain.

III.—POETIC ART.

Poetry as Art in Speech.

In the sensations of tone, Music reaches the highest subjective condition of the mind, but it does so at the cost of the fixed objectiveness of the formative Arts. Although it involves a certain objective element in the regularity of time and rhythm, as the counterpart and complement of the inner feelings, yet this cannot form the true expression of the mental states. For to this expression there is required, in addition to the needed objectiveness, the character of spirituality as well. This, however, is not possible either to the material of art in sound, or of art in figure; for the latter presents only the rigid objectivity of extended objects, while the former possesses only the transitory vibrations of matter in time. The fixed constant objectivity of the truest expression of art, in order to have spiritual and abiding reality, must essentially be of a subjective nature and a creation of the mind. And such is found in the representations of the mind itself, or in the forms of the imagination and the products of the phantasy. For, on the one hand, this artistic material is exhibited before the mind as fixed and constant in the subjective extension of its representative faculty, which, like the objects in material space, are not subject to the transitoriness and indefiniteness of vibrations in time. And, on the other hand, the objectivity of

the artistic representations is of a spiritual nature; and the mind, while fixing and securing its beautiful creations in the field of the soul as indelible forms, at the same time surrounds them with movements of vibrations in time, but with such as attain to complete definiteness of expression, in *words*, the elements of the medium employed. The material of Art now becomes a series of representations expressed in language, and in temporal succession they supersede and yet reproduce each other. The Art which exhibits the Beautiful in this material, is POETRY, and its expression is Speech.

Speech, or language generally, being the universal medium of human communication and instruction, Poetry is the universal Art which belongs to no particular epoch or people. As proper to all mankind, Poetry is found even in the cradle of the human race; and the language of poetry arose earlier than that of prose. Hence the question occurs at the outset, what is the distinction between these two kinds of speech, both as regards their form and their subjects?

As regards the poetic form of language, it may be said from the philosophical point of view, that a mere representation in itself is the most prosaic of all mental objects, since it only contains a number of sensible individual things transformed into a simple unity by the connecting power of the imagination. But the phantasy makes a prosaic representation poetical by the form in which it presents it, when it clothes the simple general representation again in a sensible image. Such imagery may be either substantially the same as the subject of the representation, or it may be such as to give more visible expression to its inner meaning as already known. That Ajax in his frenzy slaughters goats which he takes for Ulysses and the Atreidae is of itself quite a prosaic

incident, but Sophocles has the art of making it extremely poetical by a series of metaphors, as when he says that Ajax 'mowed down the full-horned slaughter' (ἔκειρεν εὔκερων φόνον). Slaughter being put figuratively for the slain, is thus personified, and imaginatively invested with horns like goats; and the subject, adorned with this picturesque epithet, is further compared to a cornfield which falls before the sharp edge of the sickle, the image of the sword of the frantic hero. On account of the indefiniteness which accompanies every figurative expression, its sense has to be divined, and at the same time raised from the subjective appearance of a particular isolated image to the objectivity of a universal idea.

Poetical expression is not limited to mere figurativeness. This is the more evident from the fact that, in the course of the development of language, the figurative expressions pass by usage and custom into prose. This holds especially of the modern languages. While the classical languages maintain a purer prose, in the East the poetical form of expression is still impressed on everything. The poetic language must therefore strive to rise above the figures already received into prose, by new and bolder images. And, generally, its whole mode of expression must be other than that which is usual in prose. This is attained, partly, by adopting peculiar words and archaisms, and partly by using certain particular combinations of words and forms of sentences. Above all, the versification whether resting upon the length of the syllables or rhyme or both, enables the poetical expression to approach the rhythm of Music. Accent, alliteration and similar adjuncts, are likewise auxiliary to poetry. But there may be prose in rhyme, and poetry without verse.

(1). This leads us then—even where the form is the

same—to consider the difference between poetry and prose in respect of their matter or subject. The first and main difference is that the poetical work of art is distinctively and essentially theoretical in its character, although the self-production of the ideal in the object, as guided by internal design, exhibit a practical side. As the purpose or end of the poem, unlike that of an action, does not lie outside of itself, all its individual members and parts are presented both as for their own sake, and as contributing to the harmony of the whole. But in so far as the representation of the higher ideal world as existing enclosed in itself, is to be taken as the model and criterion of action in practical, social and political life, there may be ascribed to poetry a certain moral utility which goes beyond the immediate effect of the artistic presentation. This was indicated for example by the inscription on a Berlin theatre: *Ridentur et corriguntur Mores.* Schiller wrote a treatise expressly on the theme: 'The Stage regarded as a Moral Institution;' and he has also treated indirectly of the same in his 'Æsthetic Education of the Human Race.' This point of view, however, remains always merely incidental to the work of art, and does not reach the essence of Art.

(2). The second characteristic of the poetical work of art, as indeed of all works of art, is that it exhibits an idea of itself universal, in a sensible individual form. While the universal ideal may be called the higher subjectivity, and its individualised expression the objective form, the resulting harmony between the subject and the object must produce that *pleasure* which accompanies all artistic realisation. And on account of the universality of the idea which accompanies such æsthetic feeling, the work of art produces in us the highest of all kinds of

enjoyment, or, as Kant puts it, a wholly disinterested pleasure.

From these two Criteria of the poetical work of art, there results at once its distinction from mere literary work, exhibited in prose, and in particular, from History and Oratory. History narrates only individual events as they have happened, and does not show what ought to happen. It must, of course, combine individual epochs and peoples into a whole representation. But even when it rises to Universal History, it does not pass beyond the form of prose; and the Philosophy of History, while representing the whole enclosed world of the human mind, moves no longer in the sphere of sensible intuition but among the conceptions and reflection of the sphere of thought. Aristotle has, therefore, said very correctly, that history narrates only what an individual, such as Alcibiades, has done and suffered, whereas Poetry will describe what a son should do when his mother has murdered his father; and in order to exhibit this universal it seeks for a particular form, such as that of Orestes. Poetry has thus the right to transform history, in order to realise its own end. Oratory, again, which may approach very closely to the form of poetry, uses its ideas only as a means for an end that lies outside of art and is entirely practical and determined by relations of fact. More particularly, it aims by the power of speech, at bringing the audience to a particular conviction, such as to rouse the citizens to a certain political action.

As regards the Division of Poetry, it may be viewed as embodying and containing within itself, in a whole, and in the element of speech, representations of all the subjects of Art. It thus embraces all the forms and stages, presented in the sphere of art, and is divided into Epic Poetry, Lyrical Poetry, and Dramatic Poetry.—(1) Epic

Poetry is the objective form into which art moulds speech as into a plastic structure, in which a part of the objective world is represented and rounded off into an ideal whole. — (2) Lyrical Poetry repeats, in the element of speech, the characteristic of music, by exhibiting, in the subjective form of emotion, the mode and manner in which the poet apprehends an object. — (3) Dramatic Poetry, finally, as the most perfect Art of all, represents the world involved and unfolding itself in experiences of individual men, as it is, and as it ought really to be. Such poetry has, therefore, human actions for its object.

I.—Epic Poetry.

Epic Poetry deals with actions as forming generally the practical expression of the human mind; but Epic actions flow not so much from the impulses of the individual as from the circumstances surrounding him. The Epic Art has to represent such actions as are determined by the conditions and relations of the whole objective world. They are indeed rather events than actions. Hence the higher Power interposes more in the Epos than may be the case in the Drama, which should flow merely from human motives. And thus the rule has been laid down that the Deity, as such, may represent the external necessity of fate in the Epos, but not in the Drama. Further, the movement of the Epic Poem is objective and is directed by the course of the successive events, the poet as such disappearing and only the events celebrated coming into the foreground.

Again, there are various *kinds* of poems comprehended under the generic name of epic poetry, which are distinguished by the nature of the object they represent. The first kind of Epic Poem is

entirely theoretical, the subject being put before the mind of the hearer or reader as it is to be received or known or realised in itself, according to its idea. This is the Didactic Poem. Its beginnings are shewn in the Inscriptions on temples and pillars, which concisely express and raise the object exhibited by the other arts into the sphere of conscious cognition. Next, we see the Didactic Poem as a representation of moral subjects in Gnomes, as in the Golden Sentences of Pythagoras, or in Proverbs. Further it may embody the idea of an industrial object, of an artistic occupation or of a mechanical dexterity, such as belongs to the subjective work of art. Of this we have examples in the 'Works and Days' of Hesiod, in Virgil's 'Georgics,' in Delilles' 'Gardening,' Frederick the Great's 'Art of War,' etc. Finally, the Didactic Poem represents the Divine and Absolute, as in the Theogony of Hesiod, in the Kosmogonies, and in the philosophical poems, such as those of Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Lucretius. In all these poems, however, the intention to instruct obscures the properly ideal nature of the work of art.

Those epic poems which represent moral relations as conjoined with the persons realising them, are purer in form. Thus the life of the family and the modifications of rural life are depicted in the Idyll. The life of the people and their military expeditions are presented in the Epic poem proper —the Epopee or heroic poem. In the Epopee, usually a whole age or nation is taken, in all the breadth of its surroundings, as the basis upon which a great event, complete and enclosed in itself, is exhibited. Such are the Iliad of Homer, the 'Jerusalem Delivered' of Tasso, the 'Orlando Furioso' of Ariosto, the 'Henriade' of Voltaire, and the 'Lusiade' of Camoens. Sometimes, however, the subject becomes still more comprehensive,

taking the form of an Epopee of humanity at large, as in Dante's 'Divina Commedia,' Milton's 'Paradise Lost,' and Klopstock's 'Messias.' But, even at the widest, with a view to the unity of action, the whole must be grouped around one principal hero. The versification, on account of the measured march of progress in the movement of the events, must be uniform and calm, as in the classical Hexameter, the Italian Tercines and Ottava Rima, the English Blank Verse, etc.

A.—THE ORIENTAL EPOS.

The historical development of Epic poetry in the East, begins in India. The Indian Epopee, as presented in the Ramayana, the Mahabharata, and the later Puranas, contains poetical theogony and philosophical doctrine, in inseparable union with the heroic poem. Wars, countries, religious ceremonies are described. Long philosophical speculations are expounded immediately before a battle. Other narratives of the most varied character are interpolated, such as that of Nalas and Damayanti. —Quite in contrast to these phantastic poems embodying the whole Hindu philosophy, we have in the poetry of the Chinese, prosaic narratives of greater or smaller compass, but in like manner, introducing us to all the domestic and public relations of that people.

To the same class of productions, belong the lesser poems among various peoples, in which the symbolical character prominently appears, and which trench upon the didactic poem in presenting a moral subject under a poetical veil. Such are the Apologue and Fable which arose in India, especially in connection with the notion of the transmigration of souls. Along with these may also be reckoned the Hebrew Book of Job, and the Parables of the

New Testament. As regards the Mohammedan Epic poetry, the element of fable is mixed up with the narrative, as in the Arabian 'Thousand and One Nights.' In the Persian heroic poem of Firdusi, again, the treatment is too comprehensive for an Epopee, as it embraces, in a manner, the whole history of the Persians from the oldest times down to the Sassanidae, without specially accentuating any particular event. The Persian Epos, further, trenches on the sphere of romantic poetry, in its Epopees of love; and again on that of didactic poetry, in its expositions of a pantheistic mysticism.

B.—THE CLASSICAL EPOS.

The perfection of the classical Epos is manifestly contained in its oldest examples—the two Homeric poems. They respond to all the demands which have been shewn to lie in the conception of the Epopee. They present a picture of the whole life of the Greeks, in its most prominent moral characteristics, both in the family and in the community. Owing to the breaking up of the family life in a royal house, a military expedition is undertaken against Ilium or Troy, and this is the basis of the Iliad. The siege of the city lasts ten years; and one event is taken for prominent treatment, and so treated that the whole Greek world is mirrored in it. All the details are grouped around the wrath of Achilles, with which the poem begins. The conflicts of the Greeks and Trojans, the deaths of Patroclus and Hector, and the closing funeral rites of the Trojan hero are consequences of this wrath. The individuals are not put so much in the background as in the Oriental Epics, in which, as Hegel observes, the substantial and universal interest of the point of view still symbolically or didactically swallows

up individuality of character and purpose. In the Homeric poems, the morality of the family, the state, and the religious faith are maintained in beautiful harmony along with particular representations of character. The gods are not mere externalities of the machinery of the poem; but, as in the first book of the Iliad, for instance, Minerva is the principle of the reflecting mind, which restrains the arm of Achilles when about to smite Agamemnon.

In the Odyssey, the same goddess appears in human form as Mentor, in order to become the safe and wise guide of the youthful Telemachus. This second poem appears to represent a narrower circle, in the fates of the royal family of Ithaca. These fates, however, are still those of a reigning house, and they are immediately connected with the great Asiatic expedition as its consequence. And while the whole representation turns around one hero, yet all the known world as then viewed by the Greeks, is presented to us in the description of his wanderings.—The *Cyclic* poets strive rather to attain completeness in their delineation of events than the exclusiveness of an individual action,—one of them, according to Horace, having begun with the egg of Leda.—In Theocritus we have the full blossom of the Idyll; while the Erotic poets approach the romantic forms of the Epic.

Among the Romans, Virgil represents all the forms of Epic poetry, in the Didactic poem, the Idyll and the Epopee, as we have them in the Georgics, the Bucolics and the Æneid. The latter has a political bearing, as seen in its carrying back the origin of the Romans to the Trojans and of Julius Cæsar to Julus, the son of Æneas, who was himself the son of Venus. This is motived by the desire to justify the claims of Rome by relation to the ancient historical reputation of the Trojan

people, and to support the apotheosis of the Cæsars, while the world of the gods is reduced to mere poetical machinery. In Lucretius, we have a philosophical poem in didactic form, and in Lucan, a historical Epos. Ovid again celebrates the deeds of the gods, as a whole, through their Metamorphoses, from the creation of the world down to the transformation of the soul of Cæsar into a god—the bald head into a hairy star!—not without some political by-play in his praise of the eternal Rome and its Emperor Augustus, nor without a certain subtle irony on the doings of the gods as brought into connection with the transmigration of souls. Finally, Satire transforms this subtle irony into the bitterest scorn, in its severe condemnation of the corrupt state of the Roman world. Although some are inclined to include Satire in Lyrical poetry, because it contains the reflections of the poet on the state of things he describes, yet it is essentially epical in its character, on account of the objectivity of its delineations. The arbitrariness of the poet is also thus counteracted, as one of them has exclaimed, *Difficile est, Satyram non scribere.*

C.—THE ROMANTIC EPIC POETRY.

1. The old heathen period of the early northern peoples, gives the beginnings of the romantic Epics. Thus we have the heroic songs of Ossian, in which descriptions of the state of the Celtic people in legends, are much intermixed with lyrical forms. The Germanic race appears at first in history with a predominating subjectivity. In contrast to the heroic legendary poems of the earliest heathen period, the Edda exhibits the more symbolical form of the heroic poem, interweaving the deeds and fates and destruction of the old heathen gods with

human events. The Niebelungen poems, which sprang likewise from the heathen period, although afterwards modified by revision in the Christian time, might be called the classical Epos of the pagan period of the Germans, without our meaning thereby—as some do—to put them on an equality with Homer.

2. The next group of romantic Epics, comprises the poems which have sprung purely from the spirit of the Christian Middle Ages. To these belongs, first of all, the Spanish Cid, as an advancing series of Romances, composed of smaller lyrically woven narratives in which chivalry is brilliantly pourtrayed. The great religious Epic of Dante, called the Divine Comedy, is the representative work of the poetical romantic art of the Middle Ages. In it the poet appears himself as the hero wandering through Hell, Purgatory and Heaven; and around him the whole Christian world of the present and of the future, is not so much grouped as mirrored in his representations. This picturing of the most transitory acts of the individual, as fixed and absolute in the forms of eternal punishment and reward, is genuinely romantic. In this second historical group, the Cid and the chivalric romances represent the lyrical and romantic side of the Christian epic poetry of the Middle Ages. Dante represents its divine and symbolical side. The classical form is also found represented in the many poems which have Charlemagne, King Arthur of the Round Table, and others as their central heroes.

3. The influence of the ancient literature enters into the Christian poetry of the third period, with the *renaissance* or revival of the sciences. At first it appears more in a negative form, as gentle irony of the phantastic element in chivalry, as we have it in Ariosto, or as deliberate satire and ridicule as it

is in Cervantes. These forms, however, are only indications of the dissolution of the romantic poetry of the Middle Ages. Further, we have the classical epopees which exhibit Christianity releasing itself from the limitations of the Middle Ages. Thus Tasso's 'Jerusalem Delivered,' of which Homer and Virgil were the models, represents an expedition of the whole of Christendom to rescue the Holy Sepulchre from the Saracens. On the other hand, the Lusiade of Camoens, advances to a much more worldly theme, in celebrating the bold exploits of the Portuguese at sea, as a form of the chivalry of the modern world. Voltaire's 'Henriade' has an entirely political purpose; its subject being founded on cival war is less appropriate for the epopee. Finally, alongside of the Catholic epopee of Dante, we must place the Protestant epics of Milton and Klopstock. In these epics, however, in place of the purely dogmatic representation of Christianity in the Italian poet, there prevails a more didactic and moral purpose, and a more theological and metaphysical tendency. The properly romantic Epos of the more modern period, is exhibited in a limited circle by idyllic narratives like Voss's 'Luise,' and Goethe's 'Herman and Dorothea,' and by the so-called Novel, or, more properly, in the detail of the heroic Romance. In such productions, the individuality of modern life is represented in all the breadth of the purposes of life with its relations in love, etc., while the highest ends are often involved in the philosophical, historical, political and social romance. Sir Walter Scott's Romances may be mentioned as leading examples of the historical kind. Most of those of Eugène Sue are social through and through, such as 'The Mysteries of Paris,' and 'The Wandering Jew,' whereas in Goethe's 'Wilhelm Meister' this direction

is only taken up at the close of the 'Years of Wandering.'

II.—Lyrical Poetry.

In Lyrical Poetry, the subjectivity of feeling, already variously manifested in the Epos, enters into the poem in contradistinction to the matter, as its appropriate substance. It does not aim at a plastic representation of the object, in accordance with the external course of events; but on the contrary, the poet now steps into the foreground to communicate to us his feelings, reflections, thoughts and emotions, on the occasion of an object presented to him. He forms the centre of the poem and furnishes its principle of unity. It is the subjective connection of the representations in his mind, and not the objective concatenation of things, which constitutes the progress of the poem. Lyrical poetry is, therefore, desultory. It is the inner music of the feelings which is represented, and hence musical tones are commonly set to accompany the words. The versification, likewise, in place of the epic regularity and uniformity, now assumes variety and liveliness of rhythm. The language also becomes bolder, more elevated, more artistic than in the epos. The lyrical poet does not even require an external incident in order to give free course to the stream of his feelings; he may at once open the depths of his own soul and present his inner emotions to the hearer for enjoyment. And for himself, as Goethe remarks, he is able to draw from this the benefit of freeing himself by thus uttering his passions, from the restraint in which they hold him.

When it is said that the subjectivity of the poet is expressed in lyrical poetry, such as Odes and

Songs, it is not meant that this form of the poetic art only represents particular feelings and individual character. The national character, as a whole, is reflected in the national Songs. And, in like manner, religious feelings and philosophical thoughts may be embodied in lyrical, as well as in Epic poetry, according to the pathos of the poet. This is seen, for instance, in the magnificent thoughts introduced into many of Schiller's poems. The lyrical poem may even deal with epical events, as in the heroic song, or in the Ballad. To this class belong also all occasional poems, whether they be Hymns, Psalms, or Sacred Chaunts on the occasion of religious festivals, or the poetical celebrations of great popular victories or triumphs. Such are, likewise, the praise of the victors in the public games, and even the glorification of domestic festivals, as in the Epithalamium or Marriage song. An industrial incident may also be lyrically celebrated. The casting of a Bell, leads Schiller to sublimest outpourings of the most varied kind. Again, there are lyrical effusions in the form of Epigrams, not as inscriptions merely, but as witty representations of the weaknesses of mankind. Further, we have in the Elegy, the lyrical expression of sorrow over a misfortune, a ruin, or such like. And, finally, the poetical Epistle must also be regarded as belonging to this form of art.

A.—THE ORIENTAL LYRICAL POETRY.

In the Oriental Lyrics the subjectivity of the poet is not awanting, but it is at the outset entirely surrendered to the essential power of the Infinite, by which it is seized and filled. This holds especially of the lyrical poetry of ancient India,

owing to the influence of the predominating pantheistic philosophy.

> 'Like as the trembling drop on the Lotus,
> So vanishes the life of man away.
> Think no longer of the severance of souls;
> The same one breath animates us all.'

In like manner we have it in the Muhammedan poems, from which Hegel takes some passages as in Rückert's translation:

> 'I looked above, and saw in all of space but One;
> Looked down, and saw in the foaming waves but One;
> O heart, whether thou swimmest in floods or glowest in heat,
> Flood and glow is but one; be it thine to be pure;
> For where love awaketh, then dieth
> The I, the dark despot of life.'

So in the Psalms of the Hebrew Monotheism, the individual seems as if to vanish in the contemplation of the greatness and omnipotence of the Absolute. The other extreme also appears in the self-abandonment of the poet to his own particular purposes and enjoyments, particularly Wine, Love, and Song, as we find it in the poems of Hafiz.

B.—THE CLASSICAL LYRICAL POETRY.

The two extremes, indicated in the Oriental lyrics, appear also in the lyrical poetry of the Greeks. They are here, however, so combined that the individuality is not merged and lost in the higher objective power, but, as Hegel says, the Ego freely unites with the universal soul which is also the essence of the individual spirit, and this personal union is realised inwardly in the poetical consciousness. The songs of praise to the gods in the Homeric Hymns, exhibit this classical, plastic type at the purest, as the forms of the Divinities pass in their objective features before the inward contemplation of the individual mind.—Pindar, who represents the zenith of the Greek lyrical poetry,

uses the victories in the games as external occasions to pour forth his enthusiastic effusions. They are deep utterances on what is heroic, divine, and moral, and on the founding of states and such like, as the fame of the victor gave his mind to sweetest thoughts.

Νόον ὑπὸ γλυκυτάταις ἔθηκε φρόντισι.

And in the eleventh Pythian Ode, he laments how he—in Theban manner—had turned aside from the victor:

Κατ' ἀμευσιπόρων τριόδων ἐδινάθην.

In the lyrical poetry of the Romans, although as a whole it is only an imitation of the Greek, the subject comes into greater prominence than among the Greeks. While the erotic element greatly predominates in Ovid, Catullus and Tibulus, Horace rises to the celebration of political events, as in his praise of the victories of Augustus and his heirs. But Hegel has pointed out by the example of the 14th Ode of the Third Book, how readily Horace turns away from public cares—when Cæsar relieves him from them—to the private feast. To all these Romans, posthumous poetical fame and the immortality of genius remained the highest good:—

'Non omnis moriar, multaque pars mei
Vitabit Libetinam.'

C.—THE ROMANTIC LYRICAL POETRY.

The Romantic Lyrical Poetry is of pre-eminent importance, because the principle of the modern national mind, lies in the predominance of the subjectivity which seeks to form what is substantial and subjective out of itself. Thus, as we have seen, even the material of epic poetry is turned by this spirit into lyrical narrative, especially in the form of romance and ballad. As regards the Division of

this stage of lyrical poetry, it may, first of all, be viewed in connection with the different races which composed the European Christian nations. This gives a general threefold division, into Slavonic, Romanic and Germanic lyrics. Among the Germans the principle of subjectivity obtains in the purest form. The Slavs have had to struggle out of the Oriental individual absorption to what is substantial and universal. Among the Romanic nations there appears generally a fusion of the Germanic and Roman culture.

1.—The Division according to time, is simpler and more convenient for historical review. In the first period, we have the Lyrical Poetry of the heathen peoples before they embraced Christianity. Here allusion can only be made to the Songs of the Bards, which were mainly war-songs composed and chanted in order to incite the people to battle. Among them, we may again mention Ossian's heroic poems and war-songs, with his elegies or lamentations over the destruction of the royal race of heroes. In his lyrics, the romantic subjectivity comes so strongly out that even his gods, as Herder remarks, represent merely a world of souls. They are the ancestors of the kings, such as Fingal; and the phantasy of the poet animates them only into shadowy forms that float upon the clouds. Thus Ossian transfers the religious view of the ancient Germans, as stated by Tacitus, into the æsthetic sphere. This principle of subjectivity, already presented in the heathenism of the ancient Germanic race, attained its full expression in the Christian Middle Ages.

2.—The Lyrics of the Middle Ages shew us the contrast, which runs through the whole of the mediæval Catholicism, between the infinite Divine

subject and the finite human subject, with the yearning of the latter to know and become identical with the former. The subjective sentiments through which the individual feels himself drawn to the Universal Being, which he strives to transform into an immanent ideal, are Love, Honour, and Fidelity. In the Provençal poets, the Troubadours, and the Minne-singers of the period of chivalry, we see the ideal of the loved one almost becoming a worship. Thus Herder has asserted with regard to the 'eternal Laura' of Petrarca, that her earthly aspect disappeared and she became to him a Madonna. The divine reverence for woman as typified and patronised by the Virgin Mary, had its antecedents in heathenism, as for instance, in connection with the priestess Velleda. The honour of chivalry, in like manner, demanded the elevation of the human in the valorous achievement of adventures of the most incredible kind, in order that the knight-errant might thus acquire the love of his lady after he had spent long time in faithfully serving her. Love became so earnest an affair that tribunals and courts were instituted to give judgments regarding it, and women had places and voices in them. In songs and romances, the subject of faithfulness in love was presented in all varieties of form.

3. After the rise of Protestantism, we see in the lyrical poetry of the modern world, the inner enjoyment of the soul in itself, and the outflow of its feelings as a purely artistic expression of the individual. In this connection Shakespeare's Sonnets cannot be overlooked. Coming down to recent times, reference may be made to Béranger, who in his French lyrics, represents the Deity as looking out of the window of Heaven to amuse Himself with the spectacle of the human world. Again, he celebrates the coronation of the Bourbon while

keenly satirising the whole royal race, and he finally gives himself up to the most cheerful enjoyment of life. Goethe, as genuinely German in his Lyrics as Béranger is French, is also full of joyousness, sociality and wisdom of life. He finds it charming to live on the dear earth, but will not throw himself madly away; and he touches betimes, as in his 'Duration in change,' on higher things. This higher world of thought is variously exhibited in the poems of Schiller, who presents in them philosophical reflections, such as the Platonic doctrine of Reminiscence, while in Goethe such ideas come out much more unconsciously. The impulse to such lyrical forms was given by Klopstock, as when in his 'Wingolf' he raises friendship to something sacred, celebrates patriotism and revels in enthusiasm for everything German. At other times he ascends in Hymns to the Divine, addressed to the Supreme Being of the abstract Metaphysics of Wolff, or even to the divinities of the old German mythology. And finally, on occasion of the French Revolution, even in his old age, he bursts into enthusiasm inspired by the idea of the supremacy of Reason.

III.—Dramatic Poetry.

The Drama is the highest form of Art in speech. It combines lyrical poetry and epic poetry with its own forms, transforming the epical events into actions which take origin from the inner states of the souls of its heroes. But again, as the completest of the arts, Dramatic Poetry unites in its most perfect representations, the two other modes of formative and musical art. For, on the other side, as in the Greek Drama, it brings the reposing Forms of the gods out of their sanctuary upon the stage, inspires them with human feeling, and involves

them in the stream of passion. From this we see the applicability to the Drama of the saying in the Greek Anthology: 'Out of thy passions, O man, thou hast made thy gods.' And, on the other hand, Music is used to accompany the words of the poetry; and, in both cases, the work of art is aided by the higher living activity of dance and song, in the artistic reproduction of the Drama upon the Stage. Further, Architecture is not wanting in the complete representation of the Drama, when we consider the accompanying decorations and the scenery. Thus, in the Drama, all the arts harmoniously co-operate to furnish us with the highest æsthetic enjoyment.

1.—As we have seen, the higher Powers may only enter into the representation of the Epos with complete poetical propriety. But in the Greek Drama, the Olympic gods appear as furnishing motives and impulses to the human actors, or as rousing them through their feelings to realise certain ends by their own actions. On this side of feeling and impulse, the individual, though related to the whole interest of the moral life, undoubtedly becomes so far passive and one-sided, when, according to his particular character, he chooses one or other of the various moral influences above or around him as his motive, and neglects the rest. But, because generally, the Collision of human passions, which forms the essential groundwork of dramatic poetry, is to be resolved by the proper development of the action, it demands the victory of the essential moral principle in the soul of the leading personalities. This solution of the moral complication, as arising out of the nature of the relations themselves, constitutes the inherent necessity running through the development of the plot. It is what the Greeks called ἄτη or εἱμαρμένη;

and it takes the place of mere external, material Fate, from which it is evident that fatalistic Dramas are erroneous in point of art. It must also be regarded as an error to cut the dramatic knot by the supernatural interposition of a *Deus ex machina.* And thus we may consider it to be one of the excellencies of the Iphigenia of Goethe, as compared with the tragedy of Euripides, that in it the eloquence of Iphigenia herself brings about the conversion and solution of the difficulty by the release at Troas.

2.—The unity of the Action is to be applied to the drama in a much narrower sense than to the Epos, because the dramatic poem represents a much more definite and particular purpose grounded upon the individual character of the hero. When in consequence of his one-sidedness, antagonistic restraints emerge through the actions of another one-sided person, and thereby another series of conflicting actions is evolved, still, according to Aristotle — notwithstanding this opposition of two actions and two heroes—the whole continues to be one action. Episodes, however, such as epic poetry admits, are not adapted for the drama, because they disturb the unity of the action. The Unity of Place and the Unity of Time, are also essential requisites in the Drama; but the former is not to be taken as demanding one particular spot without change of scene, nor is the latter to be limited to the duration of one day. It is sufficient to observe a rational unity of place and time, in subordination to the unity of the action, so that changes of scene and some duration may enter into the representation. The relations of place and time must be directly connected with the dramatic movement. The simpler action of the Drama thus determines a shorter compass in the dramatic poem than in the

Epos. The lyrical outflow of feeling is the briefest of all poetical expressions.

3. Further, every drama, in accordance with the nature of its subject, contains three essential elements, which are exhibited in at least as many Acts. These are the tying of the knot of the drama, the struggles in attempting its solution, and the catastrophe. Each of these elements, again, may be represented in several Scenes, and especially the second of them. Where there are five Acts, the three intermediate Acts present the various complications and entanglements of the action in detail. In a Trilogy, each of three main representations involves a whole dramatic action. The Versification is naturally lyrical in the Chorus. In the Dialogue it is Iambic; partly because, as Aristotle says, the Iambus is the most easily spoken measure (*μάλιστα λεκτικόν*), and partly because of its progressive and ascending form, ∪ ´, as the drama advances to the catastrophe. Hence the chorus in the 'Œdippus Tyrannus' *after* the catastrophe has taken place, use the falling Trochee, ´ ∪, in their closing moral reflections.

A.—The Forms or kinds of Dramatic Poetry arise out of the nature of the ends represented, and the different ways in which the individuals strive to attain these ends. There thus arise the three forms of representation in Tragedy, Comedy, and the Drama Proper as the union of both.—As regards Tragedy, first of all, Aristotle demands for the end in view, an earnest action of a certain greatness in itself. By this he evidently means a lofty moral subject and idea. The hero of the Tragedy, because he only embodies and represents one of the moving powers of life, and thereby does violence to the

rest, finds in this fault of limitation the ground of his tragic fate. Aristotle, therefore, requires that the hero be neither entirely good nor entirely bad, but that he commit some error which is not without a certain justification. But as he does none the less go down under the tragic collision that emerges, he excites, according to Aristotle, our pity (ἔλεος) on the one hand, and, on the other, our terror (φόβος), because we imagine that we may ourselves possibly fall into such a conflict. Through these feelings, the actor, as well as the spectator, comes to recognise the one-sidedness of the action represented, and thus their minds become enlightened and purified. A sense of reconciliation is, therefore, the closing feeling of the Tragedy, both in the perishing hero and in the onlooker. This is represented at its purest, in the 'Œdippus Colonneus' of Sophocles, as a transformation in a blessed death.

B.—In Comedy, this harmony of the moral relations is so exhibited that the individual does not perish, but maintains his power over the relations and is sure of his victory from the outset. The ends in view are mostly of a lesser kind than in Tragedy, and the actor continues to enjoy himself even when they fail. The Collision that is presented is generally placed in the contrast between the great and even absurd efforts put forth as means, compared with the pettiness of the end; and in this connection, lies also the comic and ludicrous element, which may also appear conversely in a contrast between the greatness of the end and the smallness of the means. The solution of the whole exhibits the confusion of the folly of the individual, while the moral relation in him is maintained.

C.—The Drama Proper, as the combination of

Tragedy and Comedy, is a modern invention. In it the threatening tragical collision, with all the earnestness of the action, is at the last resolved in a reconciliation, without the destruction of the persons involved. This is effected by their ceasing from strife, or by the peaceful issue of a happy concatenation of circumstances.

A.—THE ORIENTAL DRAMA.

As individuality of action is not conspicuously presented in the East, dramatic poetry has been much less developed among the Oriental peoples than epic and lyrical poetry. The Oriental world does not abound in manifestations of that resolute character which appears in the heroic pathos of Tragedy, nor in that self-certainty of the individual which leads to Comedy. The objectivity of external power continues to be the prevailing condition, as is shewn in the Epos, with the lyrical poetry of the feelings conjoined, and subjected to events. Hence the different species of dramatic poetry are not clearly separated from each other, as the best known pieces of the Chinese and the Indians go to shew.

The fatalistic Tragedy is here in place. And this character is shewn even in the Sakuntala of Kalidasa, the best known of the Indian dramas. It is a tender, graceful idyllic representation of manners. Its tragic collision arises out of the curse of a Brahman, to whom Sakuntala neglected to do reverence, because she did not see him. In the pursuit of a gazelle, the king then sees Sakuntala; and the deciding ring of fate which he gives to her, in order that she may be brought home to him in three days as his spouse, both ties and resolves the knot of the drama. Sakuntala loses the ring in the bath, and the king, on this

account, forgets her when she comes at the appointed time to his court, to claim the fulfilment of his promise. It is only when a fisherman, who had found the ring in a carp and was trying to sell it, is seized and brought to the court, that the ring is produced and recals Sakuntala to the memory of the king.

As Kalidasa lived in the time of one of the Vigramadityas, the story in Herodotus of the ring of Polycrates may have been known to him. A Prologue consisting of a dialogue between the director of the theatre and one of the female players, is prefixed to the piece; and Goethe may have imitated the Indian poet in his own Prologue to Faust. As the dramatic collision happily ends in the recognition of Sakuntala by the King, and several merry scenes are introduced, the representation verges on comedy. The undramatic side of it lies—as Herder has well observed—in the whole being made up of 'a series of events belonging to a higher order of things'; and he therefore would rather call it 'a dramatic Epos,' or 'an Epic drama'. Herder further finds the characters more idealised than individualised.

B.—THE DRAMATIC POETRY OF THE GREEKS.

It is in Greece that we first meet with dramatic art and its subordinate species, in their proper forms. Dramatic poetry appeared in its purity in Greece, because here for the first time did the individual realise his essential freedom in contrast to external power, and thus a different relation emerged between these two principles. In the Sakuntala all the forms of art are still combined; and even music adorns the representation. The same holds in Greece where music and the dancing of the Chorus form accompanying auxiliaries of

every piece. The Epic element is, however, now externally separated from the lyrical, by the reflection embodied in the Chorus appearing independently in distinction from the action. The Chorus expresses the feelings and sentiments of the general popular mind as resolving and healing the moral contradictions, while the struggle of the conflicting interests of the individuals is exhibited in the Dialogue. This severance and, at the same time, this combination of the Epical and Lyrical, were displayed in the very cradle of dramatic art in Greece, when Thespis, on his waggon, described an event, with the accompaniment of song.

The distinction between Greek Tragedy and Greek Comedy was rigidly maintained. In Tragedy, the universal external power triumphs over individual character; in Comedy the individual masters the moral relation; and in both the two elements are presented in full activity. The Philoctetes of Sophocles, however, furnishes an exception to this rule, as in that drama the unhappy beginning of tragedy is transformed to the happy termination of comedy. The Iphigenia in Tauris of Euripides and the Eumenides of Æschylus, may also be added as instances of the same kind. In all these three pieces, however, this modification takes place at the cost of the genuine tragic form, a *Deus ex machina*, in Hercules, Apollo and Minerva, being brought in to cut, instead of loose, the knot. A proper combination of tragedy and comedy, as in the modern drama, was not practically attained by the Greeks, although Plato in the Symposion, indicated such a fusion of the two; as Plautus afterwards did in his Amphitryo, if we may indeed regard that satyrical Drama as such a combination.

a.—GREEK TRAGEDY.

The Greek Tragedy exhibits the conception of the tragic form of art in its greatest completeness. It attained to this perfection by representing the whole circle of the moral powers in their completest purity, and as the animating forces in the passions and actions of free individuals. The dramatic action is enabled to exhibit these characteristics, by being laid in a time in which the moral power of the State had not yet attained to objective fixedness. The most of these powers take their most definite form in the relations of the State to the family, which the Greeks viewed as typified in Zeus and Here. They appear in the fundamental contrast of the universal and the individual life, which is also anthropologically typified in the contrast of the male and the female. The antagonism of the universal objective Powers exists only for the individual and not for the essential universal Powers themselves. The circle of the moral principalities sits enthroned, as an undivided whole, in blissful repose on Olympus, although Homer, as the result of their individualisation, presents them, somewhat humourously, as wrangling with each other. Any real discord or division only appears to arise among them, in consequence of the disturbing action of human individualities; and this not only as arising from one or the other sex, but as being generally and in itself an emphatically one-sided action.

As one of the finest examples of such a character, surrendered with exclusive passion to the control of one power, the Antigone of Sophocles may be instanced. Antigone resolves to procure the honour of burial to her brother Polynices, in order to fulfil her family duty towards him. In doing so, she violates her duty to the State, because Kreon, as

king, had ordered the enemy of the country to be deprived of this honour. Antigone's sister, Ismene, on the contrary, remains passive in this conflict between the State and the family, as she has no hankering after heroism. Kreon, again, as uncle violates the duty of the family, while he satisfies the right of the State. As every one of the actors is involved in the other side of the relation, they are committed by it, and must expiate their fault. Antigone, by order of the king, is led forth to death; while he loses his spouse and his son, Antigone's betrothed lover. The consciousness of her fault, as a purification of her passion (*κάθαρσις*), is spoken out by the heroine in the words:

παθόντες ἄν συγγνοῖμεν ἡμαρτηκότες.

With the destruction of the individual the universal power appears again in its full clearness. And the chorus, as the moral consciousness of the one-sidedness of the individuals, then pours this form of reconciliation into their souls, in name of the whole people, as spectators, in the closing words of the tragedy:

πόλλῳ τὸ φρονεῖν εὐδαιμονίας
πρῶτον ὑπάρχει· χρὴ δὲ τά γ' ἐς θεούς
μηδὲν ἀσεπτεῖν, μεγάλοι δὲ λόγοι
ἀποτίσαντες,
μεγάλας πληγὰς τῶν ὑπεραὔχων
γήρᾳ τὸ φρονεῖν ἐδίδαξαν.

The one-sidedness referred to lies in the *ἀσεπτεῖν*, *μεγάλοι λόγοι* and *ὑπεραύχων*. The purification and reconciliation is the *φρονεῖν*, and the *δαιμονία*.

In Æschylus there is a predominance of the universal side of the moral relation; in Euripides the side of subjectivity predominates; while Sophocles represents the classical equilibrium of the two elements. Aristotle calls Euripides 'the most tragic,' but only because he passes into the sub-

jectivity of emotion. Such tragic emotion is exhibited, for instance, in the Iphigenia in Aulis. The innocent Iphigenia, torn from her mother and her betrothed, is about to be offered as a sacrifice to Artemis, in order to bring about the happy departure of the Greek fleet for Troy. She does not, however, herself become the tragic personality in fact, but only furnishes her parents with the occasion of a tragic issue. Accordingly she is saved by the goddess; and a hind is substituted in her place, under the bloody knife of Calchas. It is Agamemnon who has violated his family duty in favour of the State, and indeed of all Greece; and after long years, his wife Clytemnestra revenges the injured family on the husband and the head of the State. And again in the Electra of Sophocles, their son Orestes revenges on the mother, the murder of the father and king. Thus it is that the various collisions arise; and to bring them about more easily, Aristotle advises the adoption of characters who have a relationship to each other.

b.—THE GREEK COMEDY.

In the Greek Comedy, the moral powers are likewise the object and essence of the action, and the subjectivity of the individual attains to mastery in relation to them in two ways. These are represented respectively in the Old Comedy and the New. In the Old Comedy, the State, Religion, Philosophy and such like, are the objects about which the individuals make themselves merry. These objects had already become corrupted, and were being knawed into by the principle of subjectivity. Aristophanes makes the anthropomorphic gods, as represented in the new art of Euripides, ludicrous. In the 'Clouds' he turns into ridicule the subjectivity of the Sophists under

the mask of Socrates, and he had a ground of right in so far as Socrates continued to be the representative of this inbreaking subjectivity. But Socrates developed the idea of the Good out of it, whereas the Sophists wished only to justify their selfishness by it. In Aristophanes, as well, there is found a return out of this subjectivity to essential universal morality, and to the character of the men of Marathon. But Strepsiades in the same play, the representative of this olden time, is likewise an object of scorn, as a simpleton who not only adopts the most perverse means for the attainment of his ends, but is also infected by the new principle of the advanced culture of the time, as shewn by his sophistic effort to keep off his creditor. Thus, in this character, Aristophanes even exposes the simple manners of the good old time itself to ridicule. The culmination of his irony upon the State is, however, reached in the 'Ecclesiazusae,' in which the women, on being sent alone to their own apartments, in their perversity and perversion of all good habit, go so far as to plot how to seize the reins of the affairs of State, and to rule in the place of the men.

As regards the New Comedy, we have only imitations of it in the Roman plays of Terence and Plautus. The Family, and no longer the State and Politics, is now the object of representation. Thus an old father is deceived and ridiculed by his son and a slave, and at last, the libertine subjectivity of the son, by the aid of the slave, succeeds in obtaining the betrothed of the father as his own bride. In this, we see again a reconciliation between the subjectivity of the individual and the moral universal power, but the latter is accommodated to the former. As in the New Comedy, the public power of the whole people is no longer of account, it loses the Chorus which represented the

popular voice. In the Old Comedy, it is awanting only in the 'Plutus' of Aristophanes, and this play forms the transition to the New Comedy.

C.—THE MODERN DRAMATIC POETRY.

The Drama of the Christian world is distinguished primarily from the classical Drama in presenting the subjectivity of the individual in preponderance, according to the romantic form of art. Even in the oldest dramas, the Mysteries and the Moralities, the religious material of the biblical history is often surrounded with the comic accompaniment of amusing personages. As the grandeur of individual character prominently appears in the modern Drama, the moral forces are now represented mainly as the foundation upon which the characters freely develop themselves. Their particularities are broadly unfolded in the most involved complications. The various forms of dramatic poetry are again, as in Greece, cultivated in distinct detail, and also more or less combined in the complete work of art.

The Greek Chorus, however, no longer stands in presence of the acting Persons as the voice of the people. But when the hero withdraws from the active conflict with the one-sided powers opposed to him, into reflection on his own moral consciousness, and the general moral sentiment of the people being no longer expressed externally by a Chorus, he draws out this reflection of himself in a pause of the advancing action. Thus arise the Soliloquies of the modern Drama, which take the place of the ancient Chorus. And whereas in Greece, the different forms of the dramatic art in speech, and their embellishment in music and dancing, were still conjoined in one piece: in the modern dramatic art, these elements are developed into independent wholes in the three artistic forms

of the spoken Drama, the Opera, and the Ballet The Opera belongs more to musical art in tone; the Ballet reflects plastic art in figure; while the Play Proper embodies art in speech, and at its fulness represents the culmination of Dramatic Art.

a.—MODERN TRAGEDY.

Notwithstanding the predominating subjectivity of the hero in modern Tragedy, the government of Higher Power is also represented, and moral collisions are thereby introduced. The pathetic purpose of the drama, may even be developed directly in connection with religion as the highest of all ends, of which we have an instance in the Polyeucte of Corneille. Again the moral forces may be treated separately, as the moving impulses of the individual. Thus we have an example of the representation of Jealousy in Calderon, and of Fidelity to the marriage relation in Moreto. In Shakespeare, we have likewise Marriage itself as the groundwork of the moral pathos of Cymbeline. In Romeo and Juliet, the collision arises between the romantic love of the hero and heroine, and the needed consent of the parents. In Hamlet the pathos is grounded on reflection of the understanding, to which the revenging of the father's death—after the manner of Orestes—only gives the occasion. The historical Dramas of the great English dramatist, exhibit the family quarrelling which issued in the wars of the White and Red Roses, and which determined the whole destiny of the English State for centuries. But in Shakespeare we have also a more formal and mechanical relation of character, as when Richard III is destined to become a villain, because he is ugly and lame. The struggle of the dynasties is, however, here in the background; and the greatness of the character

otherwise, softens the absence of moral qualities. But in Müller's 'Guilt' a selfish, adulterous Murderer, is exhibited to us in all the naked ugliness of the character.

In Schiller, again, the antique modes of collision are often reproduced, but more in his later works. In 'The Robbers' we see only Moore's phantastic plans of reform, in collision with the forces of contemporary society. In 'Cabal and Love' Ferdinand's romantic passion comes into conflict with the prejudices of the petty social forms of the time in Germany. But already in the 'Fiesko' the striving after political power destroys a family happiness. In 'Don Carlos' the conflicting love of the father and the son, stands in the foreground; but a political motive underlies that of the former, while in the background, are the political and religious interests represented by the fall of the Netherlands and Protestant freedom of thought. Wallenstein, a prince of the Empire, strives to elevate Germany, in opposition to the Emperor's authority. In the 'Maid of Orleans,' the liberation of the fatherland comes into collision with womanly love for the enemy of the country. The most effective moral collision is presented in 'William Tell,' who, slaying the oppressor of his country, at the same time revenges his outraged love as a father; and thus the collision, although fatal to Gessner, becomes happily resolved for the hero.

Goethe is more romantic in the manner of his collisions, if we except his 'Iphigenia' in which however, the ancient subject is romanticised by a free resolve of Thoas taking the place of the external divine command. In his 'Tasso,' collision arises between the glowing rapturous love of the poet for the princess, and the clear cold circumspection of Antonio, the prudent worldly politician, who while serving his prince holds up before his

friend the prospect of a gentler solution of his inner conflict. In 'Faust' the philosophical speculation of the hero becomes the foundation of the highest pathos, as it enters into collision with the romantic love, which is required to supplement and complete the dim theorisings of knowledge with the fresh reality of practical life.

The characters of the modern Drama are no longer, as in Greece, the mere receptacles and organs of the activity of general moral forces. But, as Hegel says, 'the modern character determines itself, and resolves according to individual wishes and wants, external influences, and such like; and thus the morality of the dramatic purpose and the characters represented may coincide, although this congruence is not fundamentally essential.' The weighing of motives and the hesitation arising from the reflection of the individual, which had a beginning in Euripides, frequently appear. The Soliloquies of Wallenstein and Corneille's Cid, may be instanced. In the 'Clavigo' we have something more than the mere vacillation of character. And, above all, in 'Hamlet' we have a delineation of the reflection of the understanding, maintaining its own persistency of character with great mastery, through all intellectual wavering and hesitation. According to Hegel, Shakespeare is a master in the representation of full individuals and characters; and he gives Macbeth and Othello as examples. On the other side we may add Falstaff, as shewing, further, how the English poet continually weaves Comedy into Tragedy, without doing so merely to please the spectators in the gallery.

The Tragic Issue does not appear so purely in the Modern as in the Greek Drama, in the form of a victory of the moral power and the merging of the personality in the Divine righteousness. In the more formal characters, we have simply the

fate they deserved, as in Macbeth and Richard III. In Wallenstein, on the other hand, we have in the ancient manner, the destruction of the individual by the power he injures. When accidental circumstances bring about the catastrophe, as in Hamlet and in Romeo and Juliet, this accidentalness is, nevertheless, correspondent to the inner necessity of the case. These heroes were no longer in harmony with the world in which they were placed, and were not adaptable to it. The influence of the consolations of Religion, may also, as in Schiller's Maria Stuart, soften the catastrophe.

b.—MODERN COMEDY.

While in the Old Comedy of Aristophanes the action perversely included in itself the self-irony of the individual, the New Comedy of the Greeks and Romans exhibited the actor more as a comic figure for the spectators. With the continued increase of individuality in the modern Comedy, this tendency has been developed and strengthened. The actor is represented as bitterly in earnest with the end he has in view. The comic presentation lies partly in the objective entanglement and complication of events—giving the Intrigue-play; and partly in the subjective unfolding of a one-sided character, as in the Bourgeois Gentilhomme, L'Avare, and Le Misanthrope of Molière, giving the Character-play. Private interests, derelictions, or follies, are displayed, and these stir the onlookers to laughter. In Shakespeare, Comedy rises higher; for with all his abundance of humour, the play always turns upon some substantial idea. In Germany, Lessing's Minna von Barnhelm, with the Prussian patriotism as a political background, presents the type of the best German Comedies.

c.—THE COMPLETE MODERN DRAMA.

The completer examples of Modern Tragedy and Comedy, constitute the transition to the last form of dramatic poetry, and of art in general, in the Drama properly so called. In this, the artistic combination of the tragic and comic elements, expressed and indicated in antiquity, is at last realised. As the individual plays a more important part in modern dramatic poetry than in the ancient representations, he also acquires the power of saving himself from the tragic collisions. The persons represented, surrender their one-sided aims, and become reconciled; and thus, without infringing upon the rights of moral Government, the misfortune or destruction of the individual may be averted. Such a play often presents the spectacle of a moral triumph: virtue being freed from the restraint imposed upon it by vice, and attaining to a happy deliverance, while vice, caught in its own snares, is unmasked and punished. Or, as Schiller puts it, not without a touch of irony: 'And when vice has broke down, then virtue sits at the table.' Were it not that Goethe's 'Tasso' is formally imperfect in its representations, and were it not that Antonio's hope of a happy reconciliation actually fails, we might have regarded this play as a complete Drama. The solution in the Second Part of Faust would, in like manner, have transformed the Tragedy into a perfect Drama, were it not that the issue is partly referred to a higher sphere beyond the present world.

We have thus gone through the whole circle of the Beautiful, from its most external forms to its freest embodiment in the deeper consciousness of the

mind. Art, on all its stages, strives to represent in its beautiful creations, the relations of the individual as subject, to the Absolute as object. In the highest dramatic representation the subject of Tragedy does not perish, in its individuality, under the higher Power, nor merely know its individual superiority in Comedy. In the happy climax of the complete Drama, the personal subject knows the higher moral Order from which it had been estranged in its conflicts, as still objectively existing and now standing in a relation of reconciliation. But the reconciliation of the subject and the Absolute, as the two sides of being which had become separated and opposed in human life, is not reached and realised at its highest and completest, even in the living consciousness and reproduction of the Beautiful. In Art, the process of spiritual reconciliation is only begun and carried out in limited form; and in order that it may be fully and finally realised, the mind must pass from the sensible and formal representations of the Beautiful, to the direct spiritual apprehension and realisation of the Absolute. Art, at its highest, in all its spheres thus culminates on the higher standpoint of Religion.

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

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

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